Case summaries

This case confirmed that the Qualification Directive makes a clear distinction between refugees and those in need of subsidiary protection. Further, that Art 28 of the Asylum Procedures Directive, which considers unfounded applications, is not applicable to those who fall within the scope of Art 15(c) of the Qualification Directive. 

This case concerned the test to be applied by the Minister as the decision-maker in applications for subsidiary protection. The Court held that it was permissible for the Minister to have regard to the reports and findings of other decision-makers in the asylum process (specifically the Refugee Appeals Tribunal). However, a particularly careful and thorough analysis will be required if the case for subsidiary protection is put on an entirely new basis which has never been considered at any stage of the process. In relation to state protection, the Court reiterated that the onus lies on an applicant to provide clear and convincing proof of a state’s inability to protect its citizens.

This case concerns the definition of the term “internal armed conflict” within the meaning of Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive:

1. When defining the term “international or internal armed conflict” as set out in Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive one has to take into account international law, in particular the four Geneva Conventions on International Humanitarian Law of 12 August 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977.
2. An internal armed conflict within the meaning of Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive does not necessarily have to extend to the whole territory of a state.
3. An examination of the requirements for subsidiary protection under Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive is not precluded if the authorities have issued a general “suspension of deportation”.

The case concerns the extent to which decision-makers should take into account a change of circumstances or situation in the country of origin.

This case concerned the argument that the decision of the Minister with regard to deciding whether to grant subsidiary protection must involve the same procedure as that which is applied in determining refugee status and that, in reviewing any such decision of the Minister, the courts must apply the same principles as apply to refugee determinations, rather than the principles that apply when reviewing the discretionary grant of humanitarian leave to remain or a decision as to non-refoulement. The Court held that nothing in the Procedures Directive required that the decision making process as to subsidiary protection should be the same as that for the refugee process, however if substantially new material was put forward in a subsidiary protection application it must be given a fair and reasoned consideration. The primary focus for deciding upon an application for subsidiary protection under the Qualifications Directive is on obtaining reliable and up to date country of origin information. It is not necessary for the Minister, in making such a decision, to engage in a dialogue with an applicant.

In its assessment of real risk of serious harm the CALL took into consideration the psychological circumstances of the applicant. The CALL considered that the seriousness of the applicant’s past traumatic experiences (as a child soldier) had left such psychological marks on him that a future forced enrolment in the army would be psychologically unbearable for him and would, in his case, amount to inhuman and degrading treatment.

The Council of State ruled that in support of an application for subsidiary protection a mere reference to the general situation in the country of origin is in principle insufficient, and that the applicant needs to make a link between that general situation and his/her personal circumstances.

There is not an internal armed conflict in Iraq. Also, the applicant has not shown that he is eligible for protection because of other severe conflict in the region.

The CALL ruled that for the recognition of subsidiary protection status (serious threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict), where doubt exists as to whether a person is a civilian or not, that person shall be considered to be a civilian.