Case summaries

This case concerned the argument that the decision of the Minister with regard to deciding whether to grant subsidiary protection must involve the same procedure as that which is applied in determining refugee status and that, in reviewing any such decision of the Minister, the courts must apply the same principles as apply to refugee determinations, rather than the principles that apply when reviewing the discretionary grant of humanitarian leave to remain or a decision as to non-refoulement. The Court held that nothing in the Procedures Directive required that the decision making process as to subsidiary protection should be the same as that for the refugee process, however if substantially new material was put forward in a subsidiary protection application it must be given a fair and reasoned consideration. The primary focus for deciding upon an application for subsidiary protection under the Qualifications Directive is on obtaining reliable and up to date country of origin information. It is not necessary for the Minister, in making such a decision, to engage in a dialogue with an applicant.

In its assessment of real risk of serious harm the CALL took into consideration the psychological circumstances of the applicant. The CALL considered that the seriousness of the applicant’s past traumatic experiences (as a child soldier) had left such psychological marks on him that a future forced enrolment in the army would be psychologically unbearable for him and would, in his case, amount to inhuman and degrading treatment.

The Council of State ruled that in support of an application for subsidiary protection a mere reference to the general situation in the country of origin is in principle insufficient, and that the applicant needs to make a link between that general situation and his/her personal circumstances.

There is not an internal armed conflict in Iraq. Also, the applicant has not shown that he is eligible for protection because of other severe conflict in the region.

The CALL ruled that for the recognition of subsidiary protection status (serious threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict), where doubt exists as to whether a person is a civilian or not, that person shall be considered to be a civilian.

The question as to whether or not an armed conflict existed has to be answered according to humanitarian law (common Art 3 of the Geneva Convention and the second additional protocol).

Honour-related violence should be examined in the context of grounds for protection and not humanitarian considerations. The Migration Court of Appeal also discussed the application of the benefit of the doubt.

Women who want to escape from a forced marriage, whose attitude is perceived by whole or part of the society of their country of origin as an infringement of the applicable customs and laws, and who therefore face a risk of persecution against which the authorities are unable or unwilling to provide protection, must be considered as members of a social group in the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention; when these conditions are not fulfilled, in particular when their behavior is not perceived as an infringement of the social order, these women nevertheless face the risk of suffering inhuman or degrading treatment and should therefore be granted subsidiary protection.