Case summaries
“Good reasons,” as defined in Art 4.4 of the Qualification Directive exist if a recurrence of past persecution is not expected and there is no enhanced risk of first-time persecution of a similar kind. At present, there are “good reasons” to consider persecution of Chechens who return to Chechnya, unless they belong to a particular risk group, will not be repeated.
The Court obliged the Respondent to conduct new proceedings as it expressed an opinion on the Claimant’s state of health without appointing an expert.
In this case the Tribunal sought to apply the guidance in Elgafaji on Art 15(c) and give country guidance on Afghanistan.
Subsidiary protection pursuant to Art. 14a(2)(b) of the Act on Asylum (serious harm consisting of inhuman or degrading treatment) may also be granted in so-called humanitarian cases. This goes beyond the scope of Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive; however, it is compatible with the directive. In order to grant subsidiary protection in so-called humanitarian cases, the factual circumstances need to reach the standard set out in the judgment of the ECtHR, D. v. the United Kingdom.
The applicant complained that the refusal to recommend refugee status at first instance contained errors such that on appeal the “core claim” was effectively being heard for the first time, and further the subsidiary protection assessment was not in compliance with statutory requirements which gave effect to the Qualification Directive; and that he should have had a chance to comment on country of origin information used in the assessment of his application.
This case concerned the criteria that needed to be fulfilled in order to establish the existence of an internal armed conflict. It was held that in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, at the time of this decision, a state of internal armed conflict was found to exist without an internal protection alternative. The applicant was therefore considered in need of protection.
Subsidiary protection can be granted if on return to their country of origin an applicant would face a real risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The question at issue was whether the reasons for such ill-treatment related to Refugee Convention persecution grounds or not. All international protection statuses require an individual threat, which cannot be indirect as the risk assessment is a future oriented examination of the possibility of a threat, along with the applicant’s individual circumstances and the probabilities of risk.
The Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN) found the applicant not credible and therefore did not assess the risk of serious harm. Instead the OIN granted protection against refoulement. The Metropolitan Court ruled that the OIN was obliged to assess conditions for subsidiary protection and serious harm even if the applicant was not found credible.
It is in violation of Art 13 of the ECHR (Right to an Effective Remedy) in conjunction with Art 3 of the ECHR (Prohibition of Torture) that the applicant may not await the court’s decision on his request for a temporary injunction against his expulsion in the Netherlands, even though he has an arguable claim under Art 3 of the ECHR. Further that Art 39 of the Procedures Directive is not correctly implemented in Dutch law.
A serious and individual threat to life and limb may result from a general risk in the context of an armed conflict if the risk is enhanced because of the applicant’s individual circumstances or from an extraordinary situation which is characterised by such a high degree of risk that practically any civilian would be exposed to a serious and individual threat simply by his or her presence in the affected region.