Case summaries
The case concerned an appeal against a decision of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) to refuse a claim for subsidiary protection status on the grounds that the applicant was excluded as a result of his activities, which were considered ‘contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.’ The appeal was successful, the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) held that exclusion clauses must be interpreted restrictively, that there must be ‘serious grounds to believe’ such acts were carried out and notwithstanding the exclusion clause, non refoulement obligations under Art 3 of the ECHR apply.
Insofaras the Federal Asylum Agency did not apply an age-appropriate standard when assessing the credibility of the minor Applicant and did not comply with the particular obligation to provide instruction and the duty of care applicable in the case of a minor, the authority committed a gross procedural error.
This case considered whether or not members of the Judiciary could be considered "a particular social group". It was found that they could not. The applicant did not convince the Court that on her return to Russia she would risk an unfair trial or unjust deprivation of liberty as a result of false allegations of bribery and knowingly handing down wrong decisions in court. The Court of Appeal considered that conditions in Russian prisons in general are not so severe as to warrant international protection.
This judgment overturned the decision of the Polish Refugee Board on revocation of refugee status. Adoption of state protection within the meaning of the law means that a foreigner benefits from the protection of the state of his nationality, that he is able to avail himself of this protection and that there exists no well-founded fear of persecution. Adoption of state protection means that the foreigner enjoys the genuine protection of his country of origin.
In proceedings on revocation of refugee status, the authority determines whether there are other reasons to justify the foreigner’s fear of persecution.
Even if it is assumed that an internal armed conflict is taking place, a serious individual risk can only be established if the degree of indiscriminate violence which is characteristic of the conflict has reached such a high level that any civilian is at risk of a serious individual threat simply by his or her presence in the region.
The suicide attacks and bombings typical of Iraq and also of the hometown of the applicants can be classified as acts of indiscriminate violence. However, a density of danger as it is necessary for the assumption of a serious and individual risk cannot be established. Nor do the applicants possess individual characteristics which result in an increased risk for them when compared to other members of the civilian population.
The facilitated standard of proof under Art. 4.4 of the Qualification Directive may be applied to the examination of subsidiary protection. Under German law, subsidiary protection is not excluded on the ground that the applicant is a “danger to the community”.
The applicant lodged an appeal before the Supreme Court challenging the decision of the High National Court to refuse granting refugee status. The refusal was founded on the application of an exclusion clause. It was held that the applicant constituted a danger to Spanish security. This decision examined the conditions required to apply this exclusion clause, namely that it has to be determined that there are “reasonable grounds” to believe that such danger exists.
The facilitated standard of proof of Art 4.4 of the Qualification Directive was deemed to be applicable both in the decision-making on the granting of refugee status and in the decision-making on the granting of subsidiary protection. The "reduced standard of probability" (of sufficient safety), as it has been developed by the German asylum jurisprudence, is no longer relevant for the examination of refugee status or subsidiary protection. In case of a concrete danger of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment the prohibition of deportation of Section 60 (2) of the Residence Act applies unconditionally, this includes deportations to signatory states of the European Court on Human Rights.
Refugee protection was not granted, since the applicant, as a member of the particular social group of "Djoula living in the South of Côte d’Ivoire" (Art 10.1(d) Qualification Directive) was not subject to political persecution when he left Côte d’Ivoire in 2001. The court found that group persecution was not established due to the insufficient frequency of acts of persecution against members of this group and therefore in case of return, the applicant would not face such group persecution.