Case summaries

It is a material prerequisite for the permissibility of a Dublin transfer of a family with children to Italy under international law to seek an individual guarantee that they will be provided with an accommodation that is appropriate for children and respects the unity of the family. This prerequisite of an individual assurance also requires it to be up to date.

A transfer decision that relies on a six months old general assurance of the Italian authorities that appropriate accommodation will be provided for, indicating the number of available places in the regions of Sicily and Calabria does not meet this requirement. Furthermore, a guarantee that does not give the names and ages of the individuals concerned is not concrete enough. 

The Supreme Court quashed the detention and deportation warrants issued against a citizen from the Congo, following a number of prosedural failures by the Cypriot Government to comply with the Cap. 105 of the Alien and Migration Law and Directive 2008/115/EC, denying him the opportunity for voluntary departure.

The question remains open and needs to be clarified in legal proceedings, whether there are systemic flaws in the Bulgarian asylum procedure and conditions of admission, such as pose a risk of infringement of Article 4 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR) (cf. Article 3(2) Regulation No. 604/2013(Dublin III)) – in particular in the case of a return under the Dublin system.

Where the transfer does not take place within the six months’ time limit, the Member State responsible shall be relieved of its obligations to take charge or to take back the person concerned and responsibility shall then be transferred to the requesting Member State Art. 29 (2) of the Dublin III Regulation.

An Applicant’s interest in remaining in a Member State pending a final decision on his asylum status prevails over the public’s interest in immediate enforcement of an ordered transfer if the appropriate asylum procedure of an Applicant in the country to which the Applicant would be deported cannot be ensured (Hungary). 

An Applicant’s interest in remaining in a Member State prevails over the public’s interest in deporting the Applicant to the Member State in which the Applicant first sought asylum if there is a predominant degree of likelihood that the Applicant will be subject to inhuman or degrading treatment in the other Member State (e.g. because of significant capacity problems and a change to its asylum law).

The case follows on from litigation presented in M.A. v Cyprus and focuses in on the legal grounds for detention in Cyprus for an applicant who is subject to removal as well as an individual’s right to speedy judicial review of the lawfulness of detention. 

A lack of attention paid to the vulnerability of the applicants as asylum seekers and children and their subsequent exposure to conditions of extreme poverty outside the State reception system has led to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

The procedure of requesting the suspensive effect of a decision rejecting an asylum application and ordering the transfer of an applicant to another Member State does not amount to an effective remedy under the Convention. 

Upon preliminary examination, it cannot be excluded that a decision of an administrative court, limited to making a Dublin transfer conditional upon the assurance of the competent authorities in the country of destination that accommodation will be provided for the family in question, violates the right to an effective remedy under Art. 19(4)(1) of the Basic Law.

Since the removal might lead to severe disadvantages for the applicants which cannot easily be compensated for and which outweigh the consequences of a preliminarily prolonged presence of the persons concerned, the removal has to be suspended until the Federal Constitutional Court has reached its final decision. 

Issuing a negative decision in asylum proceedings by the Polish Refugee Board results in an obligation to leave the territory of Poland. Such an obligation is not formulated directly in the decision itself, but is based on the legal provisions in place. Therefore, the present decision does pose a direct threat of irreparable consequences for the applicant.

Granting temporary protection, by suspending the decision under which the applicant is obliged to leave the territory, allows for the standards of fair trial and the right to court (which covers the right to a fair trial as well as the right to have the case examined, including to be delivered by a ruling), thus going further than just the right to have the case examined.