Case summaries
The decision of the Administrative Court to refuse the applicant an oral hearing was overturned. The SAC held the Administrative Court did not show the Qualification Directive (which was implemented during the proceedings) had been applied and that the Administrative Court failed to take into consideration that as an asylum seeker the applicant had limited possibilities of supporting his claim by submitting written evidence only.
In UK domestic law, if a person has made a claim for asylum but his claim has been rejected by the Secretary of State, but he has been given leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom for over a year, the person can appeal to the Tribunal on the grounds that he or she is a refugee in order to ‘upgrade’ his or her status. The Court held that the general principle of equivalence in EU Law requires that the appeal right against the rejection of the claim cannot be restricted to the grounds that the applicant is a refugee but must also allow the applicant to appeal on the grounds that he is entitled to subsidiary protection.
This concerned a claim of persecution as conscientious objector and the use of previous decisions. The first applicant claimed that he faced persecution in Israel because he was a conscientious objector. The Appeals Tribunal Member found that he was only a ‘partial’ objector and referred to a previous decision of his own in which he had entered into a detailed analysis the situation for conscientious objectors in Israel. This previous decision was not made available to the applicants or the legal issues raised were not flagged with the applicants’ legal advisors. The Court found that this previous decision was of such substance, importance and materiality that it ought to have been put to the legal representatives of the applicants for comment before the appeals were determined.
This case concerned fair procedures, namely the right of an applicant to an oral hearing of his asylum appeal. The Court held that a fair appeal does not necessarily impute a right to be heard orally.
It does not follow from any of the provisions of the Asylum Act or the Administrative Procedure Code that the Respondent must deliver a decision to an asylum applicant in his or her mother tongue or a language that he or she understands.
The failure to respect the procedural guarantees provided under Article 3.4 of the Dublin II Regulation constitutes a serious and manifestly illegal infringement of the right of asylum.
No liability in damages in EU Law under Art 16(1)(b) of the Dublin Regulation arose from the failure to promptly examine an application for asylum where the United Kingdom accepted responsibility for the claim. The obligation in Art 13 of the Qualification Directive to grant refugee status to those entitled to it could not be considered a “civil right” protected by Art 6 of the ECHR in the absence of caselaw from the Strasbourg Court expressly recognising this.
No provision imposes a time limit on the determining authority within which a decision on asylum applications has to be taken. The only obligation, for which no sanction is foreseen, is to inform the applicant when a decision cannot be taken within a period of six months.
Art 3 and Art 15 Dublin Regulation are only applicable if there exist compelling reasons to believe the receiving country is incapable of welcoming asylum applicants in appropriate conditions or if the applicants can prove that they personally risk being subjected to ill treatment or not benefitting fully from an effective right to asylum. In this case, the applicants had not demonstrated they were personally victims of ill treatment in Poland. Poland was considered to offer sufficient guarantees against deportation and for an effective and impartial asylum procedure.
This case concerned the refusal of a Refugee appeal on the basis that Sate protection was available and/or that the applicant could relocate within Nigeria and avoid persecution. In support of the finding that State was available; the Tribunal Member relied upon part of a UK Home Office Operational Guidance Note (OGN) on Nigeria that had not been provided to the applicant. The Court found that the applicant not afforded fair procedures. She had no opportunity to comment upon the information in the OGN. The Court also found that the issue of whether or not State protection is available does not depend upon the existence of a police complaints procedure but upon a determination that there exists in the country of origin as a matter of current practice, an effective system for the detection, investigation, prosecution and conviction of crimes of the kind which form the subject matter of the complaint.