Case summaries
A group shall be considered as a particular social group where, in particular, members of that group share an innate characteristic, or a common background that cannot be changed, or share a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce it, and that group has a distinct identity in the relevant country, because it is perceived as being different by the surrounding society, and membership of that group is established where the attitude of an applicant is considered by the whole or a part of the society of his/her country of origin as an infringement of the customs and laws in force, and for this reason he/she is likely to face persecution against which the authorities refuse or are unable to protect him/her.
Given the situation of particular vulnerability and constraint of the applicant, a former child soldier from the DRC, there is no reason to apply any of the exclusion clauses of Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention to him.
The group of “Iraqi citizens who cooperate with the coalition forces” in Iraq is not to be characterised as a “social group” within the meaning of the Qualification Directive (confirmation of decision of Administrative Court of Karlsruhe of the 16 April 2010, A 10 K 523/08). It cannot be assumed that any kind of cooperation with the coalition forces is an expression of a certain political conviction or that Islamist terrorist organisations would have an understanding of this kind of cooperation.
For conversion to be considered an acceptable protection ground the religious belief must be genuine.
Converts to Christianity in Afghanistan face a general risk of persecution and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on return. However, the Migration Court of Appeal found that an Afghan applicant did not prove it was reasonably likely that his conversion from Islam to Christianity was founded on a genuine belief. He had not shown that if he returned to his country of origin he had the intention to live as a convert. There was also no evidence that the authorities in his country of origin knew that he had converted.
The rationale of the decision in HJ (Iran) (see separate summary in this database) applies to cases concerning political opinion. Consequently an individual cannot be expected to modify their political beliefs or deny their opinion in order to avoid persecution. The situation in Zimbabwe was exceptional. At that time, the country guidance held that those who were unable to demonstrate their loyalty to the regime were at risk of persecution. Thus, those with no political beliefs could not be required to profess their loyalty to the regime to avoid persecution and were entitled to refugee status.
Refugee status was granted as the applicant was deemed at risk of persecution due to his homosexuality. The court found that homosexuals constitute a particular social group in Cameroon according to Section 60 (1) of the Residence Act / Art 10.1 (d) of the Qualification Directive. According to the Qualification Directive, sexual orientation does not only constitute an unchangeable characteristic, but is so fundamental to the identity of a person that he/she should not be forced to denounce it. That means that under the Qualification Directive it is no longer important if the applicant can persevere with abstinence in the long term. The punishment which the applicant would face due to homosexual acts in case of return does not simply constitute criminal prosecution, but is persecution in terms of Section 60 (1) Residence Act.
The applicant sought asylum in Spain claiming to have suffered persecution in Bangladesh on the grounds of membership of a group (the Beharies) determined by its ethnic identity. This persecution intensified when the war with Pakistan broke out. The Ministry of Interior refused the application which was appealed by the applicant to the High National Court. This court examined if persecution under the 1951 Refugee Convention could be established, beyond a case of discrimination.
The situation of generalised violence resulting from a situation of internal armed conflict ended after the victory of the Sri Lankan army over the LTTE in May 2009. Furthermore, the fact that the applicant belonged to the Tamil community was not sufficient to justify his fears of persecution considering the situation which prevails in Sri Lanka, which cannot be seen as characterising a situation in which the destruction of a specific ethnic group is pursued, since the civilians of Tamil origin are not targeted for persecution by the governmental authorities solely for reason of their ethnic origin.
Subsidiary protection was granted on grounds that the applicant, from Iran, could be at risk inhuman or degrading treatment. The applicant based his asylum claim on the political activities of his brother in his country of asylum, as well as his own participation in protests in Iran. The Court found that after having spent two years in Finland as an asylum seeker it was likely that the applicant would be of special interest to the Iranian authorities.