Case summaries

This case concerned the appropriate manner in which an application for subsidiary protection is to be decided where there may be at least an implicit claim of a “serious and individual threat” to the applicant by reason of indiscriminate violence. The Court found that Article 15(c) of the Directive does not impose a free-standing obligation on the Minister to investigate a possible armed conflict situation, it is for the applicant to make this claim and to make submissions and offer evidence establishing that he is from a place where there is a situation of international of internal armed conflict, and that he is at risk of serious harm by reason of indiscriminate violence.

“Good reasons,” as defined in Art 4.4 of the Qualification Directive exist if a recurrence of past persecution is not expected and there is no enhanced risk of first-time persecution of a similar kind. At present, there are “good reasons” to consider persecution of Chechens who return to Chechnya, unless they belong to a particular risk group, will not be repeated.

In this case the Tribunal sought to apply the guidance in Elgafaji on Art 15(c) and give country guidance on Afghanistan.

A serious and individual threat to life and limb may result from a general risk in the context of an armed conflict if the risk is enhanced because of the applicant’s individual circumstances or from an extraordinary situation which is characterised by such a high degree of risk that practically any civilian would be exposed to a serious and individual threat simply by his or her presence in the affected region.

The requirement of an individualisation of the threat to the life or person of an applicant for subsidiary protection is inversely proportional to the degree of indiscriminate violence which characterises the armed conflict.

In this case the Court of Appeal considered the interpretation of Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive applying the decision of the CJEU in Elgafaji (C-465/07; 17 February, 2009).

The situation which prevails today in Mogadishu must be seen as a situation of generalised violence resulting from a situation of internal armed conflict. Its intensity is sufficient to consider that today the applicant faces a serious, direct and individual threat to his life or person, without being able to prevail himself of any protection.

Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive only offers protection in exceptional circumstances where there is a high level of indiscriminate violence.

As soon as one persecution ground (in this case religion) exists and the other conditions for qualifying for refugee status are fulfilled, refugee status must be recognised rather than subsidiary protection, including in a context of generalised violence. 

The situation which currently prevails in the Republic of Chechnya does not amount to generalised violence resulting from a situation of internal or international armed conflict.