Case summaries

General situation in the country of origin, however difficult, does not justify granting refugee status, if there is no or only some small risk of persecutions (such risk can never be actually eliminated). However the authority is obliged to individually assess the situation of a particular applicant. This is not possible without careful examination of all the letters submitted by the applicant during the proceedings before the first and the second instance. Failure to do this cannot be validated by the Court by determining the facts on its own, since it would lead to de facto depriving the applicant of his right to have the case examined in two administrative instances.

The court overturned a decision to transfer the Applicant to his first country of asylum, Italy, on the grounds that the Prefect failed to demonstrate that Italy would have given the Applicant the relevant assurances as to appropriate reception conditions.

The court took into account the personal circumstances of the Applicant. The Tribunal found that the Prefect’s arguments were not adapted to the circumstances of the Applicant and were too general to demonstrate that transferring the Applicant to the Italian authorities would not have a substantial impact on the Applicant’s fundamental rights and the right of asylum in accordance with Article 3 of Regulation (EU) no. 604/2013 known as “Dublin III” (the “Dublin III Regulation”)  Dublin III Regulation.

The first subparagraph of Article 7(2) of the Family Reunification Directive allows the imposition of integration measures of Third Country Nationals in principle. However the general principle of proportionality requires integration measures to actually fulfil the objective of integrating TCNs and not delimiting the possibility of family reunion.

Member States must therefore consider the individual circumstances of the applicant which can lead to dispensing with the integration exam where family reunification would otherwise be excessively difficult.

The Administrative Court judged that a full and rigorous examination of the consequences of transferring the applicant back to Italy is required, given the delicate and evolving situation in the country. As this was not done the prefecture’s decision to refuse to examine the asylum application and send her back to Italy was annulled. The case was remitted to the prefecture for re-examination. 

This case related to two third country nationals who were ordered to leave the Netherlands, without being granted a period for voluntary departure, on the basis that they constituted a risk to public policy.

The CJEU gave guidance on the meaning of Article 7(4) of the Returns Directive, stating that the concept of a ‘risk to public policy’ should be interpreted strictly with an individualised assessment of the personal conduct of the person. Suspicion or conviction for a criminal offence was a relevant consideration. However, it was unnecessary to conduct a new assessment solely relating to the period for voluntary departure where the person had already been found to constitute a risk to public policy. 

This is an application for judicial review of a decision made by the defendant local authority assessing the claimant to be an adult. The court reviewed important evidence such as the initial age assessment, together with statements from claimant’s supporting witnesses and the errors of the Italian authorities’ recordkeeping and concluded that the appellant was in fact a minor.

According to the jurisprudence of the Supreme Administrative Court an oral hearing can only be waived if the complaint does not claim any facts relevant to the assessment which are in contradiction or go beyond the result of the administrative investigation procedures.

On the contrary, it constitutes a substantiated denial of the consideration of evidence by the relevant authority if a complaint questions the credibility of different sources which formed the basis of such consideration. The lack of an oral proceeding in such cases leads to a violation of the obligation to hold a trial.

With regards to a possible exclusion from asylum its severe consequences for the individual do not only require that the exclusion clauses of the 1951 Refugee Convention are interpreted narrowly but also that the facts are sufficiently established in order to determine which conduct the exclusion is based on and to weigh the reprehensibility of the offense against the need of protection of the applicant.

Considerations of the competent authority, which are limited to the assumption that the individual in question has participated in hostilities and has caused the death of opposing soldiers and civilians without further clarifying when,  on which occasion and under which circumstances such participation has taken place, do not meet the requirements for determining whether the criteria for exclusion are fulfilled.  

The case relates to a Sudanese national of Tunjur origin who claimed a risk of being subjected to ill-treatment if expelled to Sudan on the grounds of his ethnic origin and supposed ties with the JEM, the rebels’ movement against the regime in Sudan. 

The case examines the allegations of a Sudanese national- member of a non-Arab tribe in Sudan- that his deportation to that country would expose him to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention because of his race and supposed links with the rebel movements in the country. 

In order to ensure that the state is capable of providing protection, the EU Qualification Directive stipulates that a state security system must be guaranteed and also requires an examination of the special circumstances of the individual case.