Case summaries
The High Administrative Court decided that a considerable likelihood of group persecution of Hindus in Afghanistan did not exist. The “density” of recorded acts of violence was too low to justify the assumption that Hindus were facing an accumulation of human rights violations or other measures within the meaning of the Qualification Directive.
The concept of internal protection only applies if the asylum-seeker is able to reach the relevant region in a reasonable manner. In the light of Art 8 of the Qualification Directive an asylum-seeker can only be reasonably expected to stay in another part of his country of origin if he does not face risks in this region. The general situation in the region of internal protection and the applicant’s personal circumstances has to be taken into account. It is irrelevant for the granting of refugee status whether such risks likewise exist in the region of origin.
A HIV-infected person cannot be granted a residence permit in Sweden on medical grounds if health care and medicines are available in the home country, even if the person has financial difficulties and has to pay for treatment himself/herself. The economic consequences of doing so for Sweden must be taken into consideration in the decision. Further, that an assessment of whether an applicant risks being prevented from getting adequate care because of their political opinions should be made in the context of examining the need for protection and not as part of an assessment of whether there are any particularly distressing circumstances.
Honour-related violence should be examined in the context of grounds for protection and not humanitarian considerations. The Migration Court of Appeal also discussed the application of the benefit of the doubt.
This was an appeal against the decision to deport an asylum applicant to Italy, when his brother had been admitted to the asylum procedure in France. The Council of State found that, under Art 9(2) Dublin Regulation, Italy was the responsible Member State. Art 8 did not apply as the definition of family members in Art 2(i) does not include siblings. Art 15 was not applicable since the applicant could apply for asylum in Italy. Only after Italy has made a decision the application would it be France's responsibility to decide whether to grant permission to enter and reside in France.
The fact that a child suffered from epilepsy and that the quality of the care that the child could obtain in Sweden was higher than in the country of origin were not sufficient grounds to grant a residence permit on the grounds of “particularly distressing circumstances” which may only be granted in exceptional cases.
This case examines why asylum or protection grounds should be examined carefully before the issuing of a permit may be considered for ‘exceptionally distressing circumstances’ as expressed in Chapter 5 Section 6 of the Aliens Act. Once an applicant has been assessed as having a reasonably likely need for protection against a specific part of the country of origin, then the assessment of whether there is an internal flight alternative must be carried out within the framework of the provisions on protection.
The presence of an adult asylum applicant’s sibling in an EU Member State entails no obligation for that State to apply Art 7 Dublin Regulation, as siblings are not included in the definition of family members in Art 2(i). This was the case even though the applicant’s brother had been granted refugee status and, subsequently, citizenship in France.
The case concerned an application for asylum for humanitarian reasons under the provision of Art 14 of the Asylum Act. The Court held that integration and a long period of residence in the Czech Republic, including being born on the territory, are not as sufficient reasons to fulfil the conditions of humanitarian asylum.
When a transfer under the Dublin Regulation would result in a violation of fundamental rights, the Member State in which the applicant is present can examine the asylum application even though another State should have been responsible under the Dublin Regulation. In this case, the applicant’s wife was allowed to remain in France as she was in the advanced stage of pregnancy and, therefore, transferring the applicant would violate Art 8 ECHR.