Case summaries

The presumption that Italy remains in compliance with its EU and International Law obligations related to the reception and integration of asylum seekers and Beneficiaries of International Protection has not been rebutted. Asylum seekers and BIPs suffering from severe psychological trauma can be returned to Italy with no real risk of breaching article 3 ECHR, or 4 CFREU, since the Country's reception capacities have not been exceeded, while effective medical treatment is available under the same terms as to Italian nationals.

Discrepancies within evidence brought before the decision maker does not eschew the duty upon said decision maker to investigate the authenticity of the document. A person’s age is to be taken into account when evaluating evidential inconsistencies.

When relying on internal relocation a thorough assessment of all available evidence must be undertaken, including personal circumstances pertaining to the applicant. 

The administrative authorities ensured an adequate standard of proceedings and had correctly established the facts in a case of an applicant who had only brought up the argument that she was a victim of domestic violence at the court stage.

The Court does not accept the allegations that the applicant was deprived of her right to court because she and her children were deported before the deadline for the complaint to the court. The complaint was eventually lodged within the deadline which means she could benefit from the real possibility of applying this measure so her right to court was not infringed. Therefore the Court sees no need to request the Constitutional Tribunal to take a stand on this issue.

This case examines the refusal to grant international protection status to a physically disabled, single Egyptian woman. The OIN failed to provide clear, detailed reasoning why the Applicant did not meet the legal conditions to acquire subsidiary protection status in Hungary.

The Metropolitan Court of Public Administration and Labour granted subsidiary protection status to the Applicant and concluded that based on cumulative grounds the Applicant would be subject to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment if she returned to Egypt.

There is no basis to differentiate between the treatment of asylum seekers depending on whether they applied for asylum straight after crossing the border or after being placed in a detention centre. If a third country national applied for asylum from a detention centre, they can be released on the basis of article 88 section 2 of the Law on granting protection to foreigners in the territory of Poland, which states that asylum seekers shall not be placed in a detention centre, if there is a presumption that they were subject to violence.

In case of a presumption that a person is a victim of violence there is no need for “unequivocal evidence” for this legal condition.

The court cannot resign from an expert opinion if establishing a relevant fact for the case requires it. As a result the court cannot reject all the opinions or conclusions of the only opinion in the case and adopt its own view to the contrary. If the Court of Appeal had any doubts regarding the available psychologist’s opinion they should have requested the psychologist to complete the opinion or called a new expert.

The CJEU ruling concerned the scope of protection available under EU law to third country nationals suffering from serious illness whose removal would amount to inhuman or degrading treatment. The CJEU surmisedthat the removal of a person suffering a serious illness to a country where appropriate treatment was not available could in exceptional circumstances be contrary to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and in such circumstances their removal had to be suspended pursuant to Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals. The Directive 2008/115/EC required the provision of emergency health care and essential treatment of illness to be made available to such persons during the period in which the Member State is required to postpone their removal.

The CJEU ruling concerned the scope of protection available under EU law to third country nationals suffering from serious illness whose removal would amount to inhuman or degrading treatment. The CJEU ruled that, although the removal of a seriously ill person could in exceptional circumstances amount to a breach of Article 3 ECHR, the Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC) is to be interpreted as not requiring a Member State to grant the social welfare and health care benefits to a third country national who has been granted leave to reside in the territory of that Member State under national legislation.

A Member State is responsible for the asylum application of an unaccompanied minor if the minor does not have a family member in said Member State and the minor's application has been finally rejected in another Member State, provided that the unaccompanied minor resides in the relevant Member State.

The responsibility for examining an application does not cease to apply upon the mere acceptance of a request to take charge by another Member State.

This case examined the compatibility of the Dublin II Regulation with the European Convention on Human Rights regarding transfers to Italy under the Dublin II Regulation.

The Court found a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) of the European Convention on Human Rights if the Swiss authorities were to send an Afghan couple and their six children back to Italy under the Dublin Regulation without having first obtained individual guarantees from the Italian authorities that the applicants would be taken charge of in a manner adapted to the age of the children and that the family would be kept together.

In the case of the first Applicant, the exceptional personal circumstances dictate round the clock highly qualified medical care, which is provided by health care institutions in Slovenia, while home care is provided by the second Applicant. If such a sick person were forced to leave the stable conditions in Slovenia and start living in a collective centre in BiH, the first Applicant could suffer inhuman or degrading treatment due to inappropriate health care, which would represent serious harm, which in turn justifies subsidiary protection in Slovenia.

In the event that the second Applicant was returned to the country of origin, she would be separated from the first Applicant (i.e. her family) contrary to the fundamental principle of family unity. Apart from this, in the event of returning to BiH or to a collective centre in BiH, it would be reasonable to believe that, as a young Roma female without a family and means for survival, she would also be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment due to the discrimination against the Roma population.