Case summaries
Insofar as the Migration Office relied on the Applicant’s claim that he was a member of the SCNC and recognised this ground for the purposes of the subsidiary protection procedure without disputing the claim of membership of the SCNC, and insofar as the deliberations on the possibility of serious harm resulting from this membership led to the granting of subsidiary protection, it seems illogical that the Migration Office disputed these grounds in the asylum procedure because of the unreliability of the Applicant’s claim regarding membership, concluded that the Applicant had failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution on this ground, and thus refused to grant him asylum on this basis.
The case concerns whether or not the accelerated procedure used in the applicant’s claim was consistent with Art 23.4 of the Asylum Procedures Directive which allows for an accelerated procedure. It was found that the accelerated procedure was consistent with the Asylum Procedures Directive because the applicant was found not to be credible.
This case concerned the insufficient sourcing of evidence relied upon by the decision maker in dismissing the applicant’s claim for protection. It was found to be a violation of Art 16.1 of the Asylum Procedures Directive where the decision was insufficiently sourced in the applicant’s file. Further that this violation is not remedied by making specific references to those sources before the court.
The Applicant appealed before the Supreme Court against the decision of the High National Court to reject his application for refugee status. The applicant, his wife and their children claimed asylum alleging persecution on the basis of membership of a particular social group. Their claim was rejected at first instance on the grounds that the facts presented lacked credibility and the applicants could avail themselves of an internal protection alternative. On appeal before the Supreme Court, the decision of the High National Court was revoked and refugee status was granted.
This concerned whether the Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner (ORAC) were required to make an assessment of subsidiary protection, and whether ORAC were obliged to examine country of origin information in every case. The court found that ORAC were not required to make a subsidiary protection assessment. The Court held that ORAC were not obliged to examine country of origin information in every case.
The Kenyan applicant was a potential victim of female genital mutilation (FGM) and she faced forced marriage upon return. The Court stated that even if there was a risk of persecution in case of a return to the country of origin, the applicant could reasonably be expected to relocate internally as it was feasible in the circumstances.
This case concerned whether or not a proper assessment of an internal protection alternative had been carried out. It was found that careful research had not been done regarding the question of whether a part of Colombia meets the internal protection criteria as set out in Art 8.1 of the Qualification Directive, taken together with Art 8.2 of the Qualification Directive.
This case considered whether or not a “family” could constitute a particular social group under the Refugee Convention. The applicant, whose family was implicated in a vendetta, had a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of her membership of the social group that is her family. It was held by the CALL that a family could constitute a particular social group.