Case summaries

The fact that the membership of a particular social group is not subject to specific repressive criminal provisions has no incidence on the granting of refugee status.

Article 3 of the ECHR imposes an absolute obligation on contracting States not to deport an asylum seeker where doing so would expose him or her to a genuine and serious risk of violence. Under the discretionary clause in Article 17(1) of the Dublin III Regulation, this remains the case where the application does not fall within the immediate responsibilities of that State.

It is not reasonably likely that a draft-evader would face criminal/administrative proceedings in Ukraine but there is a real risk that a person sentenced to imprisonment in Ukraine would be detained on arrival there and that detention conditions would breach Article 3 ECHR.

The applicant, a stateless Palestinian and a Sunni Muslim from Baghdad, had been threatened by a Shia Militia working with or for the Ministry of Interior.

Based on the coherent, logical and consistent account in accordance with the current country of origin information the Board found the applicant exposed to persecution by the authorities or persecution supported by the authorities.

The applicant was granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1).

An application, by way of judicial review, for an order of certiorari to quash the decision of the second named defendant (that being the International Protection Appeals Tribunal) on the basis of the application of the incorrect standard of proof being applied, credibility assessment and disregard of notice of appeal and country of origin information. 

The applicant, an ethnic Somali and a Sunni Muslim belonging to the Darood Clan and Ogaden Sub-Clan, was born and raised in Libya. 

The Board found that the applicant was, as her parents and siblings, a Somali citizen. Further, considering that Somali was not the applicant’s mother tongue, that she only with difficulty was able to speak, read or write in this language, that she in reality had never been to Somalia, that she does not know anyone in this country, and is a single mother with a son of five years old, the Board found that, in accordance with the ECtHR judgement R.H. v. Sweden, she would face a real risk of living in conditions constituting inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 of the ECHR. The Board therefore granted her subsidiary protection under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (2).

The applicant, a minor, an Afghan citizen, ethnic Pashtun and a Sunni Muslim from Chahar Dara district in Kunduz Province, feared if returned to Afghanistan he would be killed or forcibly recruited by the Taliban.

The Board notes that the applicant is 15 years old, Pashtun, illiterate and the eldest son of the family where the father was killed in 2015. Further, the Board notes that according to country of origin information it is credible that the Taliban recruits young men and boys in Chahar Dara.

With reference to the applicant being a minor and without a network the Board did not find the internal flight alternative relevant or reasonable.

The Board hereafter found that the applicant had rendered probable that if returned to Afghanistan he would risk suffering serious harm covered by the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (2) and granted the applicant subsidiary protection under this article.

The applicant was granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1) because of the threat of forced marriage in Afghanistan. The applicant belonged to the particular social group of “widows in risk of forced marriage”. The Afghan State is neither willing nor able to protect women against persecution in case of forced marriage. Internal protection was not available to the applicant.

In some cases of severe illness Art. 3 ECHR precludes a deportation even though a treatment in the state of origin is possible. If the appellant cannot bear the costs of the treatment or the necessary concomitant medication the renewed increase of the illness and therefore a real life-threatening risk is probable which precludes the deportation of the applicant. 

In this case, the Supreme Court allowed the State’s appeal against a High Court Judgment in which the Refugee Appeals Tribunal was found to have erred in law in its approach to determining persecution. The Supreme Court allowed the State’s appeal on the basis that the tribunal member’s finding of no risk of persecution was not unreasonable (within the applicable standards of judicial review) and that the High Court was incorrect in finding that the extent of educational discrimination at issue in this case met the threshold of persecution required.