Case summaries
In the context of cessation of refugee status under Article 11 (1)(e), the change in circumstances must remedy the reasons which led to the recognition of refugee status; a country of origin’s ability or inability to demonstrate that it can provide protection from acts of persecution constitutes ‘a crucial element’ in this assessment.
Mere social and financial support to the third country national is inherently incapable of either preventing acts of persecution or of detecting, prosecuting and punishing such acts and, therefore, cannot be regarded as providing the protection required by Article 11(1)(e). In order to determine whether the third-country national still has a well-founded fear of persecution, the existence of protection against acts of persecution should be considered when examining the change in circumstances.
Member States are required to revoke subsidiary protection on the basis of art. 19(1), if they find out that the conditions that led to the granting of status were never met, regardless of whether the incorrect assessment of facts leading to the status is imputable exclusively to the national authority itself
UK Court of Appeal rules on the correct test to use when making a decision on cessation of refugee status.
An asylum applicant who was a victim of previous persecution in their country of origin can be granted refugee status under article 1, C 5) of the Geneva Convention. This is because, due to the severity of the treatment applied, the applicant’s fear is exacerbated to such an extent that, even if the persecution has ceased to exist, a return to the country of origin would be unthinkable.
The Secretary of State had appealed the decision of the FTT (supported by the Upper tribunal) on several grounds of error in law. The Court upheld the tribunal on the issue of whether they had considered the gravity of the respondent’s offences (section 72 of the 2002 Act); but found that the tribunals had indeed erred when considering the application of Article 1C(5) of the Refugee Convention, and on the applicability of Article 8 ECHR. They consequently remitted the case of MM’s deportation to the Upper Tribunal for re-examination in its entirety, based on these errors in the previous decisions. The statement of the referral left open for the respondent the possibility of an appeal on the basis of Article 3 ECHR.
Termination of an applicant’s international protection status (ie where there is a change or termination of protection grounds) must be examined against the principle of non-refoulement, which ensures the right to a fair and efficient procedure in which the Asylum authority assesses if non-refoulement would be violated where protection ceases.
It results from the principle of non-refoulement that the applicant in proceedings on termination of subsidiary protection must have the possibility to state all the reasons for which subsidiary protection should not cease.
In the process of renewal of subsidiary protection all the guarantees provided by Article 18 of the Constitution (Prohibition of Torture) should be respected.
Legislation which limited the assessment of the competent authority in the subsidiary protection renewal procedure only to the grounds based on which an individual has been granted subsidiary protection, is inconsistent with the right set out in Article 18 of the Constitution.
By not considering country information submitted by the applicant, the Slovenian Migration Office did not establish all relevant facts and circumstances of the case before it. The Office had not clearly and precisely explained which reasons it considered as decisive in determining that the degree of indiscriminate violence in the applicant’s country of origin did not reach such a level that the applicant would be subjected to a serious and individual threat to his life or person in the event of return to his country of origin.
In the procedure for extending subsidiary protection all reasons that the Applicant stated in his application for international protection are relevant and not merely the reasons on the basis of which subsidiary protection was recognised.
A foreigner shall cease to be eligible for subsidiary protection when the circumstances which led to the granting of subsidiary protection status have ceased to exist or have changed to such a degree that protection is no longer required. The relevant provision refers to two separate reasons that justify revoking subsidiary protection. The first is that the circumstances which led to the granting of such protection have ceased to exist. The second is that those circumstances have changed, although the change of circumstances must be of such a significant and non-temporary nature that the foreigner no longer faces a real risk of serious harm.
Subsidiary protection cannot establish a right that is comparable to, for instance, the right to obtain permission for temporary stay or indefinite leave to remain.
1. Changes in the home country are only considered to be sufficiently significant and non-temporary if the refugee’s fear of persecution can no longer be regarded as well-founded.
2. Based on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) which applies to the concept of “real risk” according to Article 3 ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights), a uniform standardof probability is applied to assessing the likelihood of persecution in the context of refugee protection; this corresponds to the standard of substantial probability.