Case summaries

The situation in Paktia province in Afghanistan meets the requirements of an internal armed conflict in terms of Section 60 (7) (2) Residence Act / Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive. An internal armed conflict does not necessarily have to affect the whole of the country of origin. The concept of internal protection does not apply if the applicant cannot reasonably be expected to reside in another part of the country because of an illness, even if that illness is not life-threatening (epilepsy in the case at hand).

This case concerned the definition of an “internal armed conflict.” Relying on international humanitarian law and in particular on the Tadic decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the CALL defined  an “internal armed conflict” as continuous conflict between government authorities and organised armed groups, or between such groups within a State. The Call also found that a ceasefire did not necessarily mean that such a conflict had ended.

The situation in Iraq is not characterised by an armed conflict within the meaning of Section 60 (7) (2) Residence Act / Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive. In any case, there is no sufficient individual risk for returnees.

This case concerns the definition of the term “internal armed conflict” within the meaning of Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive:

1. When defining the term “international or internal armed conflict” as set out in Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive one has to take into account international law, in particular the four Geneva Conventions on International Humanitarian Law of 12 August 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977.
2. An internal armed conflict within the meaning of Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive does not necessarily have to extend to the whole territory of a state.
3. An examination of the requirements for subsidiary protection under Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive is not precluded if the authorities have issued a general “suspension of deportation”.

The applicant lodged an appeal before the Supreme Court against the High National Court’s decision to reject her asylum application. She claimed to have experienced persecution in Nigeria for religious reasons: her parents were killed in a religious confrontation between Muslims and Catholics. However, she did not explain how this fact was linked to a subsequent persecution. The Court held that the applicant was not a victim of religious persecution in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention, but that she had fled from a general conflict and a situation of political instability.

There is not an internal armed conflict in Iraq. Also, the applicant has not shown that he is eligible for protection because of other severe conflict in the region.

The CALL ruled that for the recognition of subsidiary protection status (serious threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict), where doubt exists as to whether a person is a civilian or not, that person shall be considered to be a civilian.

When assessing an application for refugee status, what is important is whether the acts of persecution were carried out for the reasons identified in the Geneva Convention, and not whether or to what extent the victim of persecution can be identified with those reasons.

Fear of persecution within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the Geneva Convention need not mean that persecution is certain or even probable. Recognition of refugee status is already justified where there are reasonable grounds for asserting the possibility of persecution. “Possibility” means that persecution may take place although it is neither certain nor probable, and the “reasonable grounds” requirement indicates the need to establish real and objective evidence of the risk of persecution. The plausibility of the threat is shown by the situation in the country of origin of the person applying for refugee status as well as that person’s experience to date.

The killing of 3 IRA terrorist by SAS soldiers in order to prevent a suspected bomb attack is alleged as a deprivation of the right to life under Article 2 of the Convention. The ECtHR rules that the UK authorities were in breach of Article 2 in the control and organisation of the operation against the suspects.