Case summaries

This case concerned the application of Art 10.1 (d) of the Qualification Directive, as applied to lesbians from Iran. It was found that the "particular social group", described as homosexual (lesbian) women, has a distinct identity in Iran, because they are perceived as being different by the surrounding society (Art. 10.1 (d) (1) of the Qualification Directive).

Further, that there is a high likelihood that a homosexual relationship between women would be persecuted when detected, because it constitutes a breach of a cultural norm, even worse than among homosexual (gay) men.

Persecution by non-State actors according to Section 60 (1) sentence 4 (c) of the Residence Act (similar to Art 6 (c) of the Qualification Directive) is not established if the group of actors is small and only consists of a limited number of private persons. In this case, the "dangerousness" of the persecution is not comparable to those cases where the persecution stems from the State or State-like actors according to Section 60 (1) sentence 4 (a) and (b) of the Residence Act (similar to Art. 6 (a) and (b) of the Qualification Directive) .

A family or an extended group of relatives do not constitute a "social group" in the context of refugee protection. A family is not clearly perceived as a definable group with its own "group" identity. Such a clear definition of a family or clan could only be established if membership of the family was considered of high importance and the family or clan had a distinct identity.

Women who want to escape from a forced marriage, whose attitude is perceived by whole or part of the society of their country of origin as an infringement of the applicable customs and laws, and who therefore face a risk of persecution against which the authorities are unable or unwilling to provide protection, must be considered as members of a social group in the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention; when these conditions are not fulfilled, in particular when their behavior is not perceived as an infringement of the social order, these women nevertheless face the risk of suffering inhuman or degrading treatment and should therefore be granted subsidiary protection.

In the conditions which currently prevail in some rural areas in Eastern Turkey, the attitude of women of Kurdish origin who want to escape from a forced marriage is perceived by society and the authorities as an infringement of their customs, these women are therefore subjected to persecution committed with the assent of the population. Women who refuse forced marriage in these areas form a group whose members, by reasons of common characteristics which define them in the eyes of Turkish society, are likely to face persecution against which the authorities are unable to provide protection.

The judgment defined a particular social group as a group of persons that objectively share common characteristics or who at least are perceived to do so by society. This characteristic is often of an innate and unchangeable nature or is otherwise fundamental to human identity, conscience or to the exercise of those particular persons’ human rights. This characteristic cannot be constituted by the risk of persecution itself.

Refusal to perform compulsory basic military service cannot be considered as a reason for granting asylum, particularly if such a refusal is not connected with manifested political or religious beliefs.

Belonging to a group of people without power or influence does not constitute a particular social group and therefore cannot be deemed a convention ground for persecution under the Refugee Convention. 

The 1951 Refugee Convention does not provide protection in respect of claims of conscientious objectors who feared imprisonment for their refusal to undertake military service where there is no alternative service offered in national law. This was the position even if that objection is to all forms of military service and is absolute. The right to conscientious objection was not yet protected in international human rights law and was yet to emerge as a principle of customary international law. A claim may succeed if the applicant would be required, in the course of military service, to conduct military action that breached the basic rules of human conduct or if the punishment they would receive for refusal to serve was discriminatory or disproportionate. Secondly, when assessing whether persecution was “for” a Convention reason the decision-maker should ask the question of “what was the real reason for the persecution?”. The decision-maker should not limit the enquiry to the persecutor’s motivation but should look for the effective reason or reasons.

In assessing claims based on political opinion, a broad approach needed to be adopted to ensure that the object and purpose of the 1951 Refugee Convention was met.  Political opinion could be actual or imputed and had to be assessed in the context of the society that the applicant had fled.  Political opinion should not be restricted to issues relating to party politics nor, in the context of persecution non-state actors of persecution, was it helpful to identify those who were on the side of the forces of “law and order”.

The proposed deportation of the applicant to Iran would violate Article 3 ECHR, and as she was prevented from having the merits of her claim examined due to non-compliance with procedural time limits, there was a breach of Article 13 ECHR.  This was because she had no chance to challenge the decision on appeal, or access to a remedy with suspensive effect.