Case summaries

The principle of family unity, which is a general principle of refugee law resulting in particular from the 1951 Refugee Convention, is not applicable to persons falling within the scheme of subsidiary protection, as defined both by the Qualification Directive and by the internal legislative provisions which transpose it.

A decision to expel an applicant with post-traumatic stress disorder to Poland did not violate Art 3 ECHR. The Member States guarantee, in accordance with Art 15 of the Reception Conditions Directive, to provide asylum applicants with the necessary medical treatment. Only in very exceptional cases does an expulsion violate Art 3 ECHR, even less frequently in cases of expulsions under the Dublin II regulation.

The Minister for Justice issued a mother and her 5 children with deportation orders as failed asylum seekers pursuant to section 3(2)(f) of the (Irish) Immigration Act 1999. The only application for asylum was in the mother’s name. The children had not been issued with refugee status determinations at all and were not mentioned in the decision.  The minor applicants challenged the deportation orders on the basis that their designation as failed asylum seekers was wrong in law. They had never made asylum applications. The High Court granted the applicants leave to seek judicial review but later refused the substantive relief of orders of certiorari quashing the deportation orders on the basis that the mother’s application had covered the children. The applicants appealed to the Supreme Court as the Court deemed the issue a point of law of exceptional public importance. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment and made an order of certiorari quashing the children’s deportation orders, finding that there was no record of any decision refusing asylum applications on behalf of the children. The Court held that such a refusal was a fundamental prerequisite to the Minister’s power to make a deportation order under section 3(2)(f) of the Immigration Act 1999.  Finnegan J. also held that where an application by a parent of a minor is unsuccessful, the child is entitled to apply for asylum based on his own circumstances and that where a child’s parents are successful, the child should benefit by virtue of the principle of family unity. The principle of family unity operates for the benefit of the minor and not against him.

The provisions of Article 29(1)(b) of the Legislative Decree of 25 July 1998, No 286, which allow reunification with adult children to take place under stricter conditions than those relating to underage children or dependent parents, are consistent with the Constitution.

This was an appeal against the decision to deport an asylum applicant to Italy, when his brother had been admitted to the asylum procedure in France. The Council of State found that, under Art 9(2) Dublin Regulation, Italy was the responsible Member State. Art 8 did not apply as the definition of family members in Art 2(i) does not include siblings. Art 15 was not applicable since the applicant could apply for asylum in Italy. Only after Italy has made a decision the application would it be France's responsibility to decide whether to grant permission to enter and reside in France.  

The presence of an adult asylum applicant’s sibling in an EU Member State entails no obligation for that State to apply Art 7 Dublin Regulation, as siblings are not included in the definition of family members in Art 2(i). This was the case even though the applicant’s brother had been granted refugee status and, subsequently, citizenship in France.

The European Court of Human Rights found that the authorities in the Netherlands had violated the right to family life of five Ethiopian nationals by not allowing them to be reunited in the Netherlands.

Although the applicant, an adult without children, did not fall within the definition of a family member under Art 2(i) Dublin Regulation and could therefore not rely on Art 7 and Art 8 to defeat a transfer order, his links to family members in France could justify applying Art 3(2) or Art 15. In such a case, the definition of a family member should not be interpreted in the restrictive sense of Art 2(i). In order to apply a broader definition, the applicant must provide evidence of the intensity of the links to the family. In this case, the applicant failed to provide such evidence.

In this case, the Council of State held that the separation of a family, which results from the implementation of the Dublin Regulation, is unlawful if it has not been ascertained that the family could be reunited in one of the two countries concerned under the Regulation.

When a transfer under the Dublin Regulation would result in a violation of fundamental rights, the Member State in which the applicant is present can examine the asylum application even though another State should have been responsible under the Dublin Regulation. In this case, the applicant’s wife was allowed to remain in France as she was in the advanced stage of pregnancy and, therefore, transferring the applicant would violate Art 8 ECHR.