Case summaries

An application to suspend the effects of a decision, contained in an appeal of a decision ordering return and a ban from re-entering the territory of Poland and other Schengen area states should be allowed, due to the validity of the Applicant remaining in Poland pending the conclusion of the administrative court proceedings. Under art. 61 § 3 of the Act on Proceedings before Administrative Courts, the Court may, upon the application of the Appellant, order that the challenged decision be suspended, in whole or in part, if the act or function to be performed would result in a risk of significant harm or other consequences which are difficult to reverse.

The Judge of liberty and detention of the Toulouse Appeal Court considered that an extension of the applicant’s administrative detention could mean subjecting her to imminent forcible return to her country of origin, which was not compatible with articles 3 and 13 ECHR since a non-suspensive appeal against a decision rejecting the applicant’s asylum application was still pending and with sufficient grounds.

As a result, the Judge held that there was no reason to extend the duration of the applicant’s administrative detention.

The Judge of liberty and detention of the Toulouse Appeal Court considered that an extension of the applicant’s administrative detention would mean subjecting her to imminent forcible return to her country of origin, which was not compatible with articles 3 and 13 ECHR since an appeal against a decision rejecting the applicant’s asylum application was still pending and with sufficient grounds.

As a result, the Judge held that there was no reason to extend the duration of the applicant’s administrative detention.

Article 17 forms an integral part of the Dublin Regulation and should be applied in a manner which furthers the aims and objectives of the Regulation in general. Article 17 is a justiciable right and should be particularly relied upon in circumstances where one of the overarching values of the Dublin Regulation, namely expedition, is not being fulfilled in the procedures of the host Member State. Article 17 is not subject to a prior assessment of non-satisfaction of Article 8 (family reunification) of that same Regulation.

Applicants who engaged with Dublin authorities should be subjected to less onerous standards when assessing the success of an Article 8 ECHR claim.

The UK Upper Tribunal held that there had been a failure of the Secretary of State to lawfully exercise the discretion conferred by Article 17 of the Dublin Regulation and ordered the Secretary of State to admit the applicant to the UK, based on: (1) the deficiencies of the Italian asylum system in the present case, namely the lack of sufficient expedition to register the asylum application and initiate Dublin proceedings; (2) the deficiencies and delay in the guardianship system in Italy; (3) the expected lengthy procedures for a “take charge” request and subsequent Dublin transfer; (4) the need to take into account the best interests of children.

Article 3 of the ECHR imposes an absolute obligation on contracting States not to deport an asylum seeker where doing so would expose him or her to a genuine and serious risk of violence. Under the discretionary clause in Article 17(1) of the Dublin III Regulation, this remains the case where the application does not fall within the immediate responsibilities of that State.

Both applicants seek legal assistance and to register their application for asylum, which was previously refused by the Alpes Maritimes Prefect. The interim relief judge decided that the Prefect’s refusal to provide the individuals with an application form to register their application for asylum, notwithstanding their presence within the territory and contact with the police, amounted to a serious breach of the right to asylum.  

The Court finds that forced labour constitutes one form of exploitation subsumed by the definition of trafficking, as is clearly shown in Article 4a) of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.

The positive obligations under Article 4(2) of the ECHR must be interpreted in light of the Council of Europe Convention and the manner in which it has been interpreted by the Council of Europe's Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. Contracting States have three positive obligations under Article 4(2):

a)       an appropriate legal and regulatory framework for the criminalisation of human trafficking;

b)      operational measures on the prevention of human trafficking and the protection of victims’ rights

c)      an effective investigation and judicial procedure.

The Court quashed the decision of the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN). The OIN based its decision on classified information obtained from the Constitutional Protection Office (CPO), which stated that the Applicant poses a threat to Hungary’s national security, and that he shall not be granted protection, with due regard to Article 1 f) c) of the Geneva Convention. The OIN failed to communicate the CPO’s opinion to the Applicant for nine months. The Court assessed that the proceedings were ‘exceptionally unlawful’.

The Syrian family's application for a Humanitarian Visa at the Belgian embassy in Lebanon fell outside the scope of the Visa Code, even if formally submitted on the basis of its Article 25(1)(a), because the purpose of the application (that is, to apply for asylum upon arrival to Belgium) differs from that of a short-term visa. 

1. An application for asylum lodged in Germany only qualifies as a subsequent application within the meaning of section 71a of the Asylum Act, interpreted in conformity with the constitution, if the first asylum procedure in a country that is generally determined to be a safe third country has actually been conducted in compliance with the 1951 Refugee Convention as well as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
This is not the case, where, at the time of the decision, there have been systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedures of the third country which have put the applicant at risk of an inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Art. 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Art. 3 of the ECHR.

2. The procedure to determine whether a second asylum procedure is to be conducted also requires a personal interview of the applicant. Such an interview is only dispensable where the Federal Office of Migration and Refugees (Federal Office) can either decide on the basis of the information received on the merits of the decision whether the new application constitutes a new submission or assess already on the basis of the detailed written explanations of the applicant reliably and safely that the submission is clearly and manifestly inconsistent.