Case summaries
The Court decides that Greece is responsible for the examination of the applicant’s claim for international protection. The Court does not find that asylum procedures in Greece are flawed and that the applicant will be exposed to inhuman and degrading reception conditions. Moreover, neither the fact that the applicant’s sister is living in Germany nor the purpose of medical and psychological support in a Member State entitles the applicant under the Dublin Regulation to choose which country will examine his application for international protection.
The CJEU ruled that a third-country national who lodged an application for international protection in a first Member State, then left and subsequently lodged a new application in a second Member State is not entitled to rely, in an action brought under Article 27(1) DRIII in that second Member State against a decision to transfer them, on the criterion for defining responsibility stablished in Article 9. To conclude otherwise would not be in conformity with the Regulation’s general purpose to prevent secondary movements of individuals and the principle that an application for international protection must be assessed by a single Member State.
The CJEU also concluded that in the cases referred to in Article 20(5) DRIII, a possible transfer could occur without previously having been established that the requested Member State is responsible for examining the application. This is because the exercise of a take back request does not presume the responsibility of the requested Member State to examine the application, but that that Member State satisfies the conditions laid down in Article 20(5) or 18(1) (b) to (d). Adding to that, in a situation covered by Article 20(5), a Member State cannot issue a take back request when the applicant has provided reliable information establishing that that Member State must be regarded as responsible for the application.
There is a case of urgent necessity concerning interim measures according to § 123 VwGO obliging a Member State to accept a take charge request regarding the asylum applications of family members of a person entitled to subsidiary protection in that state when the decision on an asylum application of these family members is imminent in the requesting state.
The CJEU ruled that an asylum seeker may not be transferred to the Member State that has previously granted him international protection if such living conditions would expose the applicant to a situation of extreme material poverty. The threshold was only met where such deficiencies attained a particularly high level of severity, going beyond a high degree of insecurity or significant degradation of living conditions.
The Court further clarified that this threshold also applied where there were infringements of the provisions of the Qualification Directive, including the level of the subsistence allowance granted to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection.
Lastly, the CJEU added that the fact that the Member State that granted subsidiary protection systematically refuses, without real examination, to grant refugee status does not prevent the other Member States from rejecting a further application submitted to them by the person concerned as being inadmissible.
The discretionary clause in Art. 17 II Dublin-III regulation might under certain circumstances oblige the member states to take charge of an applicant. This can be particularly the case, if the competence of the member state under chapter III of the Dublin-III regulation would not be given because of a deadline expiry the applicant had no influence on.
Article 8 (1) of the Dublin III Regulation provides for a subjective right to family reunification, both for the applicant himself and for the family members present in the Member State responsible. This right is also justiciable to the extent that denial of transfer affects the rights to family unity and the best interest of an unaccompanied minor.
The expiry of the time limit for the submission of a take charge request pursuant to Article 21 (1) of the Dublin III Regulation, as well as for the submission of a request to review the rejection of a take charge request (so-called "remonstration") pursuant to Article 5 (2) of the Implementing Regulation to the Dublin II Regulation, does not reverse the responsibility back to the requesting Member State if the failure to comply with the time limit cannot be attributed to the applicant and family unity and the best interests of the child take precedence over the procedural rules on time limits.
Due to the paramount importance of the right to family unit and the best interests of the child, the discretion under Article 17(2) of the Dublin III Regulation translates into a legal obligation of the Member State to invoke the sovereignty clause where there are close family ties. Beyond such family ties, no further special relationship or interdependency is required.
Whether a minor is "unaccompanied" within the meaning of Article 2 lit. j of the Dublin III Regulation depends on the domestic law in the Member State where the minor is present.
The Court decides that a beneficiary of international protection cannot be deported to a country in which the individual concerned faces a serious risk of inhumane or degrading treatment. The risk of destitution after deportation is only excluded when the receiving state authorities provide a specific, and not just a general, assurance to the individual concerned.
The CJEU ruled on the time limit for Member States to respond to requests for re-examination of "take charge" or "take back" requests and clarified that Member States should endeavour to respond within two weeks; if they do not the requesting Member State retains responsibility.
Pursuant to Section 60 paragraph 5 of the Residence Act, refugees recognised abroad cannot be deported to the state in which they are recognised if the living conditions expected there contradict Article 3 of the ECHR. This presupposes that the situation in the country of destination reaches the minimum severity required for Article 3 ECHR, but an "extreme danger" within the meaning of the case-law regarding Section 60 paragraph 7 sentence 5 Residence Act is not a prerequisite.
A Syrian citizen who has been recognised as a refugee in Bulgaria cannot be deported to Bulgaria because of the degrading living conditions awaiting him there.
The official date of an Islamic marriage contracted in Syria needs to be determined with reference to Syrian law. An official notice by the Dutch Foreign Affairs Ministry’s states that “in the opinion of the Syrian authorities, the date set by the Sharia Court will be the official date of marriage.”
If according to the marriage certificate issued by the Sharia Court the marriage predates a sponsor’s entry into the Netherlands, it is sufficiently established that a valid marriage existed before this entry, also when registration before the Sharia Court took place after the entry.