Case summaries

The applicant, an ethnic Somali and a Sunni Muslim belonging to the Darood Clan and Ogaden Sub-Clan, was born and raised in Libya. 

The Board found that the applicant was, as her parents and siblings, a Somali citizen. Further, considering that Somali was not the applicant’s mother tongue, that she only with difficulty was able to speak, read or write in this language, that she in reality had never been to Somalia, that she does not know anyone in this country, and is a single mother with a son of five years old, the Board found that, in accordance with the ECtHR judgement R.H. v. Sweden, she would face a real risk of living in conditions constituting inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 of the ECHR. The Board therefore granted her subsidiary protection under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (2).

A Dublin Transfer to Italy should be prevented when the person concerned is a vulnerable person as per in Article 3 (2) Dublin III Regulation.

An application for asylum filed prior to 20 July 2015 cannot be considered inadmissible because subsidiary protection has already been granted by another Member State (if the protection applied for is more favourable than the existing protection). The assessment of the admissibility of an application for asylum filed prior to 20 July 2015 is subject to the laws, regulations and administrative provisions adopted pursuant to the now superseded Asylum Procedures Directive (Directive 2005/85/EU) which provided for inadmissibility of an application for asylum if refugee status had already been granted by another Member State. 

The Applicant and the Applicant’s children were applying for leave to remain in Sweden due to affiliation with their husband and father respectively who had permanent residency in Sweden. The Applicant and the Applicant’s children were all granted evidentiary relief regarding their identities. Further, one of the Applicant’s children, a 20 year old daughter, was deemed to fulfil the criteria for household community and special dependency. The Applicant and all of the Applicant’s children were granted leave to remain. 

Art 20 (3) of the Dublin III Regulation is no longer applicable when a minor subsequently enters another member state after the application for international protection of his/ her relative is completed.

The detention of a Somalian national is declared by the European Court of Human Rights to constitute a violation of Articles 3, 5 (4) and 5 (1). The cumulative effects of the detention conditions amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment and the detention could not be deemed lawful due to the lack of an effective remedy during detention and insufficient justification under Article 5 (1) (f). 

In case of conflict between a domestic and international norm the Court is obliged to adhere to the latter and set aside the former. Given the well-established right to an effective remedy in international and European instruments, an element of which relates to the remedy’s timeliness, the court is obliged to remake the OIN’s subsidiary protection decision and provide the applicant with refugee status. This conclusion applies notwithstanding that domestic legislation prohibits the Court from reforming an OIN decision. To abide by this legislation would result in a never-ending appeal procedure thereby rendering the remedy ineffective.

Taking into account all the circumstances of the case, the Court found that the detention conditions of the applicant did not amount to a breach of Article 3 ECHR. However, Malta’s domestic law remained in violation of Article 5 § 4 ECHR as it did not provide an effective remedy to challenge the lawfulness of the detention. The applicant’s detention after being granted subsidiary protection for a further 5 days was a violation of Article 5 § 1 ECHR.

Deprivation of liberty as allowed by art. 5.1(f) of the Convention not only has to be with a view to deportation, but it also has to be in compliance with national law, and free from arbitrariness.

The submission of an asylum application does not as such imply that detention is no longer with a view to deportation.

When balancing the applicant’s right to family reunification and the protection of the rights of others in relation to the welfare of the state, which would be lessened if the application for family reunification were approved, the Supreme Court favours the latter since according to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, countries enjoy a certain margin of appreciation when protecting the right to family life.