Case summaries

1. An application for asylum lodged in Germany only qualifies as a subsequent application within the meaning of section 71a of the Asylum Act, interpreted in conformity with the constitution, if the first asylum procedure in a country that is generally determined to be a safe third country has actually been conducted in compliance with the 1951 Refugee Convention as well as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
This is not the case, where, at the time of the decision, there have been systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedures of the third country which have put the applicant at risk of an inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Art. 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Art. 3 of the ECHR.

2. The procedure to determine whether a second asylum procedure is to be conducted also requires a personal interview of the applicant. Such an interview is only dispensable where the Federal Office of Migration and Refugees (Federal Office) can either decide on the basis of the information received on the merits of the decision whether the new application constitutes a new submission or assess already on the basis of the detailed written explanations of the applicant reliably and safely that the submission is clearly and manifestly inconsistent.

The Supreme Court granted the cassation complaint lodged by the Polish Ombudsman in the case of a persecuted journalist forced to leave the country together with her son and accused of deception in order to obtain attestation of false information (in a form of a visa issued by a Consul). The Supreme Court agreed that there was a reasonable doubt with regard to the circumstances of the case and the guilt of the defendant. In the view of the Court, even if the defendant acted in a way which could be defined as deception in order to obtain attestation of false information, the circumstances of the case, the statements of the defendant and her clarifications should lead to a question whether the defendant could have acted in a state of necessity (i.e. the sole means by which she could have safeguarded an essential interest from a grave and imminent peril was to sacrifice another interest of lesser importance) while leaving the country.

Asylum authority’s decision regarding the application of the safe third country principle quashed. The Court pointed out that the application of the STC principle is ‘absolutely unacceptable.’

The Court of Appeal in Warsaw and the court of the first instance agreed that the detention of the applicant and her two children was unlawful from the moment the respective court decided on prolonging their detention as irregular migrants, although they have already applied for international protection.

Both courts agreed also that the amount of compensation for unlawful detention is dependent on the degree in which the state contributed to the trauma of the applicants and their inconvenience. In the present case, taking into account the available psychologists’ and psychiatrist’s opinions, the Courts decided that the poor health condition of the applicants was to a great extent caused by traumatic events experienced before coming to Poland – which eventually resulted in granting them refugee status.

However, the Court of Appeal decided to significantly increase the amount of compensation granted to the applicants, especially children, who were particularly vulnerable in this situation. 

The mere fact that the applicant does not have an identity document does not mean that there was a reason for limiting his freedom of movement based on the first alinea of Article 51(1) of IPA (establishment of identity). The mere presumption that the applicant has deliberately thrown the passport away in order to conceal his identity and country of origin does not mean that doubts exists concerning the applicant’s identity. Doubts of the identity of applicants for international protection may exist for example if the applicants change their personal information during the procedure.

An asylum applicant can be sent to a Safe Third Country by a Member State who has admitted responsibility under Dublin III in the context of a take back request, where the applicant has left the responsible Member State before a decision on the first asylum application has been taken on its merits.

The absence of information being provided to the sending Member State by the receiving Member State on the latter’s legislation and practice regarding STC does not prevent an asylum applicant being sent to a STC or breach  an applicant’s right to an effective remedy

Where an applicant has been taken back by a responsible Member State there is no obligation on the State to re-open the examination of the application at the exact point where it was left.

Asylum seekers cannot refer to a delayed take charge request by one Member State to another, in particular when the requested Member State has accepted the request. Article 17 (1) of Regulation No. 343/2003 (Dublin II) does not guarantee individual protection for asylum applicants against a transfer to another Member State. 

The Dublin regulations do not allow for priority to be given to the processing of different types of transfer applications. In particular, there is no priority which favours a transfer application made on the Applicant’s own initiative as compared to one which is ordered by administrative compulsion. In deciding the application, the executing authority must allow the Applicant to transfer without administrative compulsion if it appears certain that (i) the Applicant will voluntarily travel to the Member State responsible for reviewing his application and, (ii) will report in a timely manner to the responsible authority. A transfer without administrative compulsion is not a deportation (Abschiebung), and therefore does not result in a statutory ban on entry and residence under Sec. 11 of the Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz).

The operation of an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution or serious harm and access to such system by the claimant may not, in a given case, amount to protection. Article 7(2) of the Qualfication Directive is non-prescriptive in nature. The duty imposed on states to take “reasonable steps” imports the concepts of margin of appreciation and proportionality.

The procedural guarantee in Art. 4 of the Dublin Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 is mandatory. The guarantee concerns the asylum seekers right to information when they present an application for international protection.

This safeguard is not respected solely because the applicant has undergone a personal interview, he needs to be given the “Common Leaflet”. This aims at guaranteeing that the information has been delivered in a proper way and in a clear and objective manner.