Case summaries
When a Dublin transfer does not take place within the six-month time limit prescribed in the Dublin III Regulation, responsibility for examining the application for international protection is automatically shifted to the Member State that requested the Dublin transfer. Moreover, the Court extends the scope of the right to an effective remedy provided in the Dublin III Regulation, specifying that an applicant for international protection can challenge a Dublin transfer before a national court by invoking the expiry of the prescribed six-month time limit.
The appellant claimed that the Tribunals in their determinations had failed to give adequate reasons for their conclusions, in particular that the appellant had not demonstrated well-founded fear. The Court considered the grounds for this claim and found that since we should ‘avoid a requirement of perfection’ (para 26) they were not sufficient to establish that the tribunals had erred, nor that the claimant was at risk of persecution.
The applicant, an ethnic Kurd and a Yarsan from Kanehar, Kermanshah, Iran, had performed religious activities aimed at spreading the knowledge of the faith and thereby attracted the attention of the authorities.
The majority of the Board accepted the applicants account and consequently the Board found that the applicant risked persecution because of his Yarsan religious activities and granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1).
In its decision, the tribunal defined the concept of ‘written’ according to the Dublin III Regulation. It also found that the a couple who were engaged did not constitute a family (according to the Regulation) unless they got engaged in their country of origin. Finally, the tribunal found that the sovereignty clause only afforded power to the State which was exercising it under the supervision of the administrative judge.
The Defendant faced two charges, that of a ‘prohibited immigrant’ and of illegally entering the Republic of Cyprus, whilst at the same time he had applied for asylum. With the aid of effective legal representation, he was found not guilty on both charges.
The Court of Appeal concluded that to send a refugee who has a residence permit in Italy and an asylum seeker back to the country would not violate Article 3 ECHR.
The court further constrained the decision in Tarakhel to families with minor children.
A general circular letter send by Italian authorities is not a sufficient individual guarantee regarding a Dublin Transfer of a man suffering from various serious diseases.
Non-collaboration on the part of a person detained for the purpose of return may not be used as a basis for indefinite detention. In such a case, prolonged detention without a reasonable prospect of return is arbitrary in light of Article 5(1)(f) ECHR.
The case considered an application against the decision of the Secretary of State refusing to consider the merits of the Claimants’ contentions for asylum, on the basis that Hungary was considered to be a “safe” country that would presumably comply with its EU and international legal obligations. The Claimants argued that they would be at risk of refoulement to Iran if removed to Hungary, in breach of their rights under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Claimants further argued that along the way, they would be at risk of detention in conditions and circumstances amounting to an unlawful violation of their fundamental right to freedom and liberty under Article 5(1)(f) ECHR. The court held that removal of the Claimants to Hungary gives rise to a real risk of chain refoulement to Iran. However, there was insufficient evidence to make out breach of Article 5 ECHR.
An asylum seeker who was interviewed by telephone during his detention in the waiting zone by an officer of the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) in premises which were not subject to OFPRA’s director general’s prior approval has not benefited from the appropriate procedural guarantees attached to the examination of his application.
Consequently, the Ministry of Interior’s order rejecting Mr D’s request to enter the French territory, which was taken in light of an OFPRA opinion given in such circumstances, must be annulled.