Case summaries

In the midst of the health crisis, the judge of liberty and detention of the Lille Judicial Tribunal considered that the health risk for the Applicant as well as for a third party, generated by the extension of the administrative detention was disproportionate to the perspectives of return. Especially since most countries had closed their borders.

As a result, the judge held that there was no reason to extend the duration of the Applicant’s detention.

The case refers to an appeal to the Supreme Court brought by the appellant against the High National Court’s decision to reject the appellant’s administrative appeal against the denial of his application for refugee status. 

The appellant is a Columbian national and claims to fear political persecution if he is returned to his country because of threats from the FARC group (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia) due to the appellant’s refusal to permit two of his sons to join the armed group.

 The Supreme Court rejects the appeal, affirming the High National Court’s decision to deny asylum.Furthermore, the Supreme Court rejects the appeal for protection on the grounds of humanitarian considerations as contained in Spanish Law.   

The case concerned an appeal lodged before the High National Court against the decision of the Ministry of Interior to refuse to grant refugee status based on the application of two exclusion clauses, Art 1F(a) and 1F(b) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The applicant challenged the application of the exclusion clauses arguing an individual assessment was required, as well as evidence of participation in the crimes mentioned. The appeal was rejected. 

This decision concerns an appeal lodged before the Supreme Court against the decision of the High National Court, confirming the Ministry of Interior’s decision to revoke the refugee status of the appellant and her children. This revocation was issued following the voluntary return of the applicant’s husband to Colombia, his country of origin.

This appeal challenged a negative decision of the Ministry of Interior to refuse family refugee status extension to the applicants whose son was granted refugee status in 2006.

The applicant claimed asylum in 2006 (along with her children) alleging a well founded fear of persecution on the grounds of political opinion. The application was refused in the initial procedure and on appeal.  She returned to Colombia and two years later, returned to Spain and reapplied for asylum and was again refused. She lodged an appeal before the Supreme Court and was granted subsidiary protection.

The case concerned an appeal submitted before the Supreme Court against the decision of the High National Court to refuse refugee status on the grounds that it was not established that the persecution alleged against the applicants was individually and personally targeted. The Supreme Court found that the High National Court erred in requiring a higher standard of proof than what was needed. The High National Court had required the applicant to demonstrate ‘conclusive evidence’ (“full evidence”) of persecution, however, a lower standard of evidence was required by the law.

The Applicant appealed before the Supreme Court against the decision of the High National Court to reject his application for refugee status. The applicant, his wife and their children claimed asylum alleging persecution on the basis of membership of a particular social group. Their claim was rejected at first instance on the grounds that the facts presented lacked credibility and the applicants could avail themselves of an internal protection alternative. On appeal before the Supreme Court, the decision of the High National Court was revoked and refugee status was granted.

The Supreme Court held, in light of a UNHCR Report concerning Colombian asylum seekers, that the burden of proof had been reversed; the High National Court had to establish that the Colombian authorities could effectively protect the applicant from the agents of persecution.

This case concerned whether or not a proper assessment of an internal protection alternative had been carried out. It was found that careful research had not been done regarding the question of whether a part of Colombia meets the internal protection criteria as set out in Art 8.1 of the Qualification Directive, taken together with Art 8.2 of the Qualification Directive.