Case summaries

The Respondent concluded that the Appellant represents a danger to the security of the Slovak Republic, although there was no information in the administrative file on the basis of which it might reach such a conclusion (valid premise). It is thus a clear case of the findings of fact (that the Appellant represents a danger to the security of the Slovak Republic) being in conflict with the contents of the file. Such a situation constitutes a ground for setting aside a contested decision under the provisions of Section 250j(2) of the Civil Procedure Code.

If the Respondent had information on the basis of which it reached a valid premise, according to which the Appellant represents a danger to the security of the Slovak Republic, this must exist in a form (usually written) which enables the parties to the proceedings, their representatives or the reviewing authority to acquaint themselves with the contents thereof. If, however, the Respondent, despite the existence of this information, failed to place it in the administrative file, the file must be regarded as incomplete, which constitutes a ground for setting aside a contested decision under the provisions of Section 250j(3) of the Civil Procedure Code.

In applying Art 12 of the Qualification Directive concerning exclusion from refugee status, the decision-maker is required to conduct an individual assessment of the applicant’s circumstances and, specifically, of his own complicity, if any, in crimes against humanity.

The applicant could not substantiate the individual elements of his claim with respect to his well-founded fear of a blood feud; however, he was able to satisfy the criteria for subsidiary protection. As a result of the armed conflict that was ongoing in the respective province in his country of origin (Ghazni, Afghanistan), the high intensity of the indiscriminate violence was deemed to be sufficient to be a threatening factor to the applicant’s life. As a result, the criteria of subsidiary protection were fulfilled.

The Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) returned the case to the Administrative Court for reconsideration based on the applicants' change of circumstance (conversion to Christianity in Finland) which only became apparent during the appeal before the SAC.

The Administrative Court did not consider credible the claim that the applicant’s conversion to Christianity had come to the attention of the Afghan authorities. The Court held that even if this information had reached the authorities, the applicant would not be at risk on return.

This case considered exclusion from refugee status and found that criminal proceedings are not required for the application of Art 12.2 of the Qualification Directive or Art 1F of the Refugee Convention.

The applicant came from a district in Afghanistan, which according to up-to-date country of origin information, also contained areas judged as being safe. When considering internal protection for subsidiary forms of international protection, the decision maker must also consider whether or not the applicant is able to reach these areas safely. The roads could not be considered safe and the other presented routes were also not considered feasible for the applicant. As the applicant could not resort to internal protection elsewhere, he was granted a residence permit on the grounds of humanitarian protection in accordance with section 88 a § of the Aliens’ Act.

The Court found that the province of Ghazni, Afghanistan was still unstable and unsafe for the local population due to the presence of an internal armed conflict. However the security situation in Kabul had not deteriorated to the extent to be classified as an internal armed conflict.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the Tribunal must make a best interest of the child determination in considering an asylum appeal made by an unaccompanied minor. Further, that although the Secretary of State has a duty to trace the applicant’s family under the Reception Conditions Directive, this duty exists independently of the obligation to appropriately consider an asylum claim. Therefore the Secretary of State’s failure to act on the basis of the duty is not a ground on which an asylum appeal could be allowed.  

This case concerned exclusion and confirmed that Art 12.2 of the Qualification Directive, should be interpreted so that the determining authority must perform an individual examination of the applicant’s case and assess the individual responsibility according to the objective and subjective criteria, as set out in the judgment of Germany v B and D.  In such cases, the burden of proof does not rest with the applicant but on the determining authority.