Case summaries

The Applicant’s objective fear was not considered well-founded as persecution was not considered reasonably likely. It was held that there was a reasonable likelihood that, should he return, the Applicant would be forced to live as an internally displaced person in degrading conditions because he lacked the family network that would be required in order to reintegrate him into his homeland socially and financially. Exposure to extreme living conditions constitutes degrading treatment and deporting a person to a country where he would be subject to such conditions violates Article 3 of the ECHR. Subsidiary protection status was therefore granted.

The Asylum Court rejected an appeal against the decision to expel the applicant, who has a medical condition, and her daughter to Italy. The situation in Italy was assumed to be in accordance with the Reception Conditions Directive and there was, therefore, no real risk of a violation of Art 3 ECHR. There was no violation of Art 8 ECHR as the applicant’s son had been living in Austria for 10 years, which meant there was no family life worth protecting.

The case concerns an Afghan national who applied for a residence permit for the purpose of residing with his

wife and children who had been granted Netherlands nationality. He complained about the refusal to exempt him from the statutory administrative charge, EUR 830, required to obtain a decision on his request for a residence permit and which he could not afford to pay. The Court examined that complaint under Article 13 (right to an effective remedy).

The Plaintiff’s previous experience does not lead to the  conclusion that the Plaintiff is afraid of persecution (in the event that he was returned) based on race, religion, national identity, membership of a particular social group or a certain political belief, as his fear is based on the possible consequences of retribution merely because he fled. According to the judgment of the Supreme Court the fact that he fled from the Taliban does not make him a “member of a particular social group” on the basis of which his refugee status could be recognised.

Because the Plaintiff did not mention his current political conviction and his current anti-Taliban religious belief when applying for international protection he is not entitled to a refugee sur place status. 

This case concerned the concept of ‘safe country’ within the Dublin system and respect for fundamental rights of asylum seekers. The Court held that EU law prevents the application of a conclusive presumption that Member States observe all the fundamental rights of the European Union. Art. 4 Charter must be interpreted as meaning that the Member States may not transfer an asylum seeker to the Member State responsible within the meaning of the Regulation where they cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of the provision. Once it is impossible to transfer the asylum seeker to the responsible Member State then subject to the sovereignty clause the State can check if another Member State is responsible by examining further criteria under the Regulation. This should not take an unreasonable amount of time and if necessary then the Member State concerned must examine the asylum application. 

The Asylum Court allowed an appeal against the decision to transfer the applicants, a family with both physical and psychological medical conditions, to Italy. Given the applicants’ exceptional circumstances and the problems Italy has with capacity, the lack of reliable assurances from the Italian authorities in relation to medical treatment and accommodation gave rise to a risk of a violation of Art 3 ECHR.

In considering the possible exclusion under Art 1F, careful consideration must be given to culpability. Domestic law including any defences must be accurately cited. When the applicant is a child, consideration of her age and understanding; together with consideration of her welfare must form part of the overall analysis. If a child is found to be excluded from asylum or humanitarian protection the welfare of the child should be considered when arrangements for other leave to remain are considered.

The Applicant fled to Austria to be with her husband. She pleaded no reasons for fleeing such as problems of living as a woman in Afghanistan and the Federal Asylum Agency also made no investigations into this aspect. Only in the appeal were specific women’s issues raised. The Asylum Court decided that the Federal Asylum Agency was obliged to undertake the appropriate investigations under apparent theoretical circumstances relevant to asylum (such as gender), even if the party did not initiate such a submission. 

Appeal against the General Secretary of the Ministry of Public Order's negative decision no 95/52986 of 28.4.2006 on a claim for asylum before the Appeal Committees formed pursuant to Articles 26 & 32 of Presidential Decree 114/2010 and the Minister of Citizen Protection's decision 5401/3-505533 of 7.11.2011 (385/8-11-2011 FEK YODD) pursuant to which the present Committee was formed.

This case involved a fear of persecution because of religious beliefs (atheism) as well as because of membership of a particular social group (personality shaped in a non-Islamic society / westernisation). In particular, the Committee ruled that if the Applicant were to return to Afghanistan now or in the near future, because of his atheism and the consequent non-conformity with the Islamic way of life of the society into which he would need to integrate, in conjunction with the fact that his personality has been shaped in a non-Islamic society with customs and a way of life totally different from those of Muslims, he would be reasonably likely to suffer aggressive social attitudes, threats and social exclusion which, taken cumulatively, could amount to persecution. Besides, should he return to a small rural community in Afghanistan – given the Applicant's particular personality and how it had been shaped – it is very likely that he would not be able to conceal his religious beliefs (atheism) and thus there was a reasonable chance that he would be at risk of criminal prosecution because of his atheism and his 'apostasy' from Islam (prosecution which is reasonably likely to lead to imprisonment or execution). This, however, would constitute a direct and severe violation of his fundamental right to religious freedom, especially in the context of the specific social, religious and political unrest and the absence of legal guarantees in the Applicant's country of origin.

It was held that even if he were not criminally prosecuted, the Applicant would, in any case, be at risk of suffering harm from non-state actors in the form of persecution; and that the Afghan State, police and other authorities were incapable of providing adequate and effective protection, mainly because of the lack of organisation and the corruption which prevails at all levels.

The applicant sought to have the decision of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal (RAT) to refuse to recommend refugee status set aside, on the basis that the RAT had implicitly found him to be entitled to refugee status, but had then proceeded to find that he was excluded from same due to his activities in Afghanistan, without however carrying out an assessment of his individual responsibility, having regard to the standard of proof required by Article 12(2) of Council Directive 2004/83/EC, as transposed into Irish law by the European Communities (Eligibility for Protection) Regulations 2006.