Case summaries

The actual risk of inhuman treatment or punishment by the Taliban because of desertion from one of their forced recruitment training camps can justify a deportation ban according to clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act (Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive) in the case of Afghanistan.
Targeted criminal violence is defined in Article 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act) but not in Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (7) p. 2 of the Residence Act), because in this context there is no specific risk of an internal armed conflict, i.e. “indiscriminate violence”.  

The conclusion can be drawn on the basis of the B. and D. judgment that, based on the description of Hizb-e Wahdat in the official report as a violent organisation, a policy of presuming 'personal and knowing participation' on the part of aliens who have fulfilled specific roles within the organisation is consistent with Article 12(2) of the Qualification Directive.

The procedure of the Court did not include decisive evidence for an assessment of whether, as a ground for revoking protection status, the complainant represented a danger to the security of the Slovak Republic, thereby infringing the complainant’s right to respond to all of the evidence, under Article 48(2) of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and under Article 38(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in conjunction with Article 13(4) of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and Article 4(4) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. The basis on which the competent authorities reach a decision must be clear from the administrative authority’s file and from the court file, even where no explicit reason is provided in the statement of reasons for their decision.

When reaching a decision, the Defendant should have protected the best interest of the child. Taking into account the fact that the Applicant is a minor and providing legal representation for a minor applicant, are necessary elements in the process of demonstrating and establishing the facts. The principle of protecting the best interest of the child has to be enforced when assessing the risk that the absolute rights of the child might be violated if he is returned to his country of origin and needs to be reflected in the Defendant’s burden of proof as well as in the rules and standards of  evidence (in relation to subsidiary protection).

The Defendant should already have started searching for parents during the procedure for international protection and not only once the procedure for removing the child from the state has begun.   

Threats and violence against a person’s family members can be considered as acts of persecution where that person is connected to the facts which previously led to the violence..

The Plaintiff needs to state all circumstances known to him in relation to his persecution; however he does not need to establish a material and legal connection between the persecution and the reasons for persecution.

The fact that somebody is a child in Afghanistan can mean that he belongs to particular social group.

The Applicant’s objective fear was not considered well-founded as persecution was not considered reasonably likely. It was held that there was a reasonable likelihood that, should he return, the Applicant would be forced to live as an internally displaced person in degrading conditions because he lacked the family network that would be required in order to reintegrate him into his homeland socially and financially. Exposure to extreme living conditions constitutes degrading treatment and deporting a person to a country where he would be subject to such conditions violates Article 3 of the ECHR. Subsidiary protection status was therefore granted.

The Asylum Court rejected an appeal against the decision to expel the applicant, who has a medical condition, and her daughter to Italy. The situation in Italy was assumed to be in accordance with the Reception Conditions Directive and there was, therefore, no real risk of a violation of Art 3 ECHR. There was no violation of Art 8 ECHR as the applicant’s son had been living in Austria for 10 years, which meant there was no family life worth protecting.

The case concerns an Afghan national who applied for a residence permit for the purpose of residing with his

wife and children who had been granted Netherlands nationality. He complained about the refusal to exempt him from the statutory administrative charge, EUR 830, required to obtain a decision on his request for a residence permit and which he could not afford to pay. The Court examined that complaint under Article 13 (right to an effective remedy).

The Plaintiff’s previous experience does not lead to the  conclusion that the Plaintiff is afraid of persecution (in the event that he was returned) based on race, religion, national identity, membership of a particular social group or a certain political belief, as his fear is based on the possible consequences of retribution merely because he fled. According to the judgment of the Supreme Court the fact that he fled from the Taliban does not make him a “member of a particular social group” on the basis of which his refugee status could be recognised.

Because the Plaintiff did not mention his current political conviction and his current anti-Taliban religious belief when applying for international protection he is not entitled to a refugee sur place status. 

This case concerned the concept of ‘safe country’ within the Dublin system and respect for fundamental rights of asylum seekers. The Court held that EU law prevents the application of a conclusive presumption that Member States observe all the fundamental rights of the European Union. Art. 4 Charter must be interpreted as meaning that the Member States may not transfer an asylum seeker to the Member State responsible within the meaning of the Regulation where they cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of the provision. Once it is impossible to transfer the asylum seeker to the responsible Member State then subject to the sovereignty clause the State can check if another Member State is responsible by examining further criteria under the Regulation. This should not take an unreasonable amount of time and if necessary then the Member State concerned must examine the asylum application. 

The Asylum Court allowed an appeal against the decision to transfer the applicants, a family with both physical and psychological medical conditions, to Italy. Given the applicants’ exceptional circumstances and the problems Italy has with capacity, the lack of reliable assurances from the Italian authorities in relation to medical treatment and accommodation gave rise to a risk of a violation of Art 3 ECHR.