Case summaries

General information about the country of origin indicating that returning refugees (in Kabul) often end up subjected to degrading conditions must be taken into consideration in determining the reasonableness of an internal protection alternative (IPA). If not, then the constitutional, judicial obligation to give reasons is breached. 

Even if an unaccompanied minor refugee has entered the country together with a brother (sister) of full age, Art 6 Dublin II Regulation is applicable to the former and within the meaning of the judgment of the CJEU of 06.06.2013, case C-648/11, the relevant country of the asylum application is responsible. With regard to the accompanying brother (sister) of full age, use should be made of the right to assume the examination owing to the family connection in order to avoid a violation of Art 8 ECHR.

The Applicant challenged the first instance decision and was granted refugee status on the basis of a fear of persecution on grounds of his imputed political opinion, which was not identified by the asylum authority (OIN). The asylum authority considered Kabul as an alternative for internal protection, which was rejected by the Court since the Applicant had no family ties and employment in Kabul, which is getting overpopulated and residents are threatened by terrorist attacks.

The Respondent's evidence on the safety situation in Kabul and the possibilities for seeking employment, finding somewhere to live and establishing social networks provided the grounds for the Respondent's decision as well as for the judgment by the court of first enstance, both of which stated that the Applicant, in the event that he returned to Kabul, in his country of origin, would be provided with internal protection from serious harm, and that he is thus not entitled to subsidiary protection in the Republic of Slovenia.

Rather than dismissing the application, the Court recognised the subsidiary protection status of the Applicant, as his/her return to the country of origin would lead to the risk of serious harm (inhuman, degrading treatment or indiscriminate violence).

This case concerned an application for a licence for a civil marriage with a Greek citizen where there was an inability to provide a certificate of being unmarried or a birth certificate because of disrupted relationship with homeland and in the context of the submission of a sworn statement regarding the absence of any impediment to marriage. The case considered the balance between the safeguards of family law and a State's obligation to protect the fundamental rights of refugees. Under the principle of proportionality, the private and family life of the individual is inviolable, bearing in mind that the lack of evidence of being unmarried should not prevent the him from being granted a licence to enter into a civil marriage with his partner, the mother of their two minor children which he has already voluntarily recognised. It is possible to substitute in concreto the said evidence with a simple sworn statement and, therefore, the Applicant does satisfy the legal requirements for the granting of a marriage licence.

A arrived in Finland via four transit countries using forged travel documents. When he/she was caught he/she applied for asylum in Finland. The Supreme Administrative Court took the view that Article 31(3) of the Geneva Convention on Refugees prevented A from being persecuted for the crime of fraud.

The Applicant, an unaccompanied Afghan minor, stated that he had left his home country owing to his abduction and the threat of sexual abuse by the local ruler. The right to a decision by the statutory judge was violated by the fact that the decision on the application for international protection was made by a court panel consisting of two judges, one male and one female.

When rejecting an application for international protection under the safe third country concept, Article 27 (2) (a) of the Procedures Directive needs to be taken into account. According to this article, the "connection" between the Applicant and the safe third country needs to be ascertained during the process. 

The Council of State applied the reasoning employed by the CJEU in its ruling C-179-11 of 27 September 2012 and considered that temporary waiting allowance must be paid to asylum applicants subject to the Dublin II Regulation until they have actually been transferred to the Member State responsible for their asylum application.