National case summaries
A Stateless Palestinian and Sunni Muslim from Lebanon, single woman, born and raised in Saudi Arabia who had a conflict with her family because she had had a relationship with a French Christian man and lost her virginity.
The Board found that seen in isolation as a Stateless Palestinian the applicant is covered by the Danish Aliens Act Art 7 (1).
The Board found that because the applicant had never resided in Lebanon, did not have any relation to that country, and due to her conflict with her family and based on country of origin information regarding entry options to Saudi Arabia as well as Lebanon for Stateless Palestinians, neither Saudi Arabia nor Lebanon could be considered as a first country of asylum. Consequently, the applicant was granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1).
An application, by way of judicial review, for an order of certiorari to quash the decision of the second named defendant (that being the International Protection Appeals Tribunal) on the basis of the application of the incorrect standard of proof being applied, credibility assessment and disregard of notice of appeal and country of origin information.
An application seeking leave for judicial review to quash the decision of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal on the basis of the Tribunal failing to take into account relevant information and a misapplication of Regulation 5(2) of S.I. 518 of 2006.
After having committed several offences qualified as being of a ‘particular gravity’, Mr.O’s refugee status was revoked on April 21st 2006.
Upon appeal to the Council of Alien Law Litigation (‘CALL’), the question of the validity of article 55/3/1 of December 15th 1980 law (the ‘1980 Law’) arose. Although it is established that this provision is transposing article 14(4) of the Directive 2011/95/EU, its compatibility with the Geneva Convention must be verified.
The Council refuses then to pronounce itself on the question, arguing the competency of such matter is vested in the Court of Justice of the European Union.
Granting someone a refugee status for fear of persecution based on belonging to a social group due to his sexual orientation, cannot be linked to the fact that his sexual orientation has, or not, been made public. Indeed, a social group is instituted by how society perceive those in the group.
An individual applying for asylum does not have, in order to avoid persecutions in his country, to hide his sexual orientation.
In order to prove the risk of persecution, there is no requirement that belonging to a social group based on sexual orientation must be prohibited by any criminal law in the country of origin of the applicant. In fact, this risk can be based on abusive common law provisions, or behaviours, whether they are supported, facilitated or merely tolerated by the country’s authorities.
Where the ECtHR has, under Article 39 of the ECHR, granted interim measures prohibiting the Government from deporting the Applicant, this does not impact the ability of national courts to rule on the Applicant’s claim to asylum. The interim measures are binding on national authorities only.
The applicant, who had deserted the Syrian army, was seen in isolation covered by the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1) [refugee status]. However, the Board found serious reasons to assume that the applicant had committed a crime against humanity and war crimes during his military service and consequently he was excluded from protection. Nevertheless, the Danish Aliens Act Art. 31, (2) is an obstacle to his expulsion as he would risk persecution covered by the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1) in the case of returning to Syria.
A new Constitution accompanied by a new Constitutional Court illustrates the existence of a protection system as per the 1951 Geneva Convention in the relevant country.
Regarding family reunification, individuals can be considered as belonging to the same family if there is a clear economic dependency, not merely because they have biological ties. In order to establish this dependency, the judge may use both national and international sources.
This case concerned a judicial review challenge of a Refugee Appeals Tribunal decision where the Court held that there must be a thorough analysis as to the forward looking fear of a person being returned to Pakistan on account of their religion.