UK - AT and another (Article 8 ECHR – Child Refugee – Family Reunification : Eritrea) [2016] UKUT 227 (IAC), 29 February 2016
| Country of Decision: | United Kingdom |
| Country of applicant: | Eritrea |
| Court name: | Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) |
| Date of decision: | 29-02-2016 |
| Citation: | AT and another [2016] 227 (IAC) |
Keywords:
| Keywords |
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Assessment of facts and circumstances
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Description
The duty of the state to carry out an individual assessment of all relevant elements of the asylum application according to the provisions of Article 4 of the Qualification Directive, including considering past persecution and credibility; and the duty of the applicant to submit as soon as possible all statements and documentation necessary to substantiate the application. |
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Best interest of the child
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Description
Legal principle required to be applied as a primary consideration when taking measures concerning minors in the asylum process. “Any determination or assessment of best interests must be based on the individual circumstances of each child and must consider the child’s family situation, the situation in their country of origin, their particular vulnerabilities, their safety and the risks they are exposed to and their protection needs, their level of integration in the host country, and their mental and physical health, education and socio-economic conditions. These considerations must be set within the context of the child’s gender, nationality as well as their ethnic, cultural and linguistic background. The determination of a separated child’s best interests must be a multi-disciplinary exercise involving relevant actors and undertaken by specialists and experts who work with children." |
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Individual assessment
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Description
The carrying out of an assessment on an individual and personal basis. In relation to applications for international protection, per Article 4(3) of the Qualification Directive, this includes taking into account: (a) all relevant facts as they relate to the country of origin at the time of taking a decision; (b) the relevant statements and documentation presented by the applicant; “(c) the individual position and personal circumstances of the applicant, including factors such as background, gender and age, so as to assess whether, on the basis of the applicant's personal circumstances, the acts to which the applicant has been or could be exposed would amount to persecution or serious harm; (d) whether the applicant's activities since leaving the country of origin were engaged in for the sole or main purpose of creating the necessary conditions for applying for international protection, so as to assess whether these activities will expose the applicant to persecution or serious harm if returned to that country; (e) whether the applicant could reasonably be expected to avail himself of the protection of another country where he could assert citizenship.” |
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Family unity (right to)
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Description
“In the context of a Refugee, a right provisioned in Article 23 of Council Directive 2004/83/EC and in Article 8 of Council Directive 2003/9/EC obliging Member States to ensure that family unity can be maintained. Note: There is a distinction from the Right to Family Life. The Right to Family Unity relates to the purpose and procedural aspects of entry and stay for the purpose of reuniting a family, in order to meet the fundamental right enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.” “A right to family unity is inherent in the universal recognition of the family as the fundamental group unit of society, which is entitled to protection and assistance. This right is entrenched in universal and regional human rights instruments and international humanitarian law, and it applies to all human beings, regardless of their status. ….Although there is not a specific provision in the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the strongly worded Recommendation in the Final Act of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries reaffirms the ‘essential right’ of family unity for refugees.” |
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Child Specific Considerations
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Description
Application of a child-sensitive process and assessment of protection status, taking into account persecution of a child-specific nature and the specific protection needs of children. “When assessing refugee claims of unaccompanied or separated children, States shall take into account the development of, and formative relationship between, international human rights and refugee law, including positions developed by UNHCR in exercising its supervisory functions under the 1951 Refugee Convention. In particular, the refugee definition in that Convention must be interpreted in an age and gender-sensitive manner, taking into account the particular motives for, and forms and manifestations of, persecution experienced by children. Persecution of kin; under-age recruitment; trafficking of children for prostitution; and sexual exploitation or subjection to female genital mutilation, are some of the child-specific forms and manifestations of persecution which may justify the granting of refugee status if such acts are related to one of the 1951 Refugee Convention grounds. States should, therefore, give utmost attention to such child-specific forms and manifestations of persecution as well as gender-based violence in national refugee status-determination procedures.” See also the best interests principle. |
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Family member
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Description
"Generally, persons married to a migrant, or having a relationship legally recognised as equivalent to marriage, as well as their dependent children and other dependants who are recognised as members of the family by applicable legislation. In the context of the Family Reunification Directive 2003/86/EC (and 2003/109/EC, Long-Term Residents), a third-country national, as specified in Article 4 of said Directive and in accordance with the transposition of this Article 4 into national law in the Member State concerned, who has entered the EU for the purpose of Family Reunification… In the context of Asylum, and in particular Council Regulation (EC) 343/2003 (Determining responsible Member State for Asylum claim), this means insofar as the family already existed in the country of origin, the following members of the applicant's family who are present in the territory of the Member States: (i) the spouse of the asylum seeker or his or her unmarried partner in a stable relationship, where the legislation or practice of the Member State concerned treats unmarried couples in a way comparable to married couples under its law relating to aliens; (ii) the minor children of couples referred to in point (i) or of the applicant, on condition that they are unmarried and dependent and regardless of whether they were born in or out of wedlock or adopted as defined under the national law; (iii) the father, mother or guardian when the applicant or refugee is a minor and unmarried." |
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Family reunification
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Description
"The establishment of a family relationship which is either: (a) the entry into and residence in a Member State, in accordance with Council Directive 2003/86/EC, by family members of a third-country national residing lawfully in that Member State (""sponsor"") in order to preserve the family unit, whether the family relationship arose before or after the entry of the sponsor; or (b) between an EU national and third-country national established outside the EU who then subsequently enters the EU." |
Headnote:
A refusal to permit re-unification of family members with a child granted asylum in the United Kingdom can constitute a disproportionate breach of the right to respect for family life enjoyed by all family members under Article 8 ECHR despite the Immigration Rules not providing for family reunification where a child has been granted asylum in the UK.
Facts:
Decision & reasoning:
Judge McCloskey first turns to the authenticity, interdependency and strength of the family unit, which has not been diminished but rather grown in intensity since the sponsor’s stay in the UK and his 18th birthday.
Turning next to the Immigration Rules Judge McCloskey noted that no provision (with the exception of certain temporal policy decisions) had been made for family reunification in the case of a child who has gained refugee status in the UK. Therefore, it was the interference with Article 8 ECHR which was at play during the proceedings and notably whether the refusal decisions of the ECO were proportionate to the legitimate aim at play, namely immigration control.
Noting that the balance to be struck when assessing Article 8 is the weighing up of the rights of the individual and the interests of the community, the Upper Tribunal refers to a range of national, European and international instruments, namely Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration 2009 Act which in turn originates from Article 3(1) of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Upper Tribunal further makes reference to the tracing obligation in the Convention as well as a UN General Comment on the treatment of unaccompanied children, including the entry of parents, and the Family Reunification Directive. Whilst not applicable to the UK by virtue of the opt-out clause Judge McCloskey finds the Directive indirectly applicable on account of the statuory guidance “Every Child Matters” to the UK Border Agency published on Section 55(2) of the 2009 Act. Attention was further paid to the maintenance of family unity in the Qualification Directive as well as ECtHR case law, namely Draon v France where the Grand Chamber identified positive obligations on States by virtue of Article 8 in order for the respect for family life to be effective.
Turning to the public interest assessment the Tribunal noted that States have a certain margin of appreciation when examining the proportionality of a measure. This margin is variable according to whether public interest considerations have culminated in primary legislation. The Tribunal notes that the Immigration Rules do not have the status of parliamentary legislation and in this vein cites from ZAT and Others v UK, which likewise concerns a blanket exclusion, where the Tribunal found that the public interest had been assessed generally and no account was taken of the applicants’ individual circumstances. Citing SS(Congo) and others Judge McCloskey reiterated that where the interests of a child are at issue the width of margin of appreciation tends to be reduced. In addition SS(Congo), reified by ECtHR jurisprudence, puts forward the test of the most adequate means for the development of family life, which must be assessed in conjunction with the age of the child, dependency and the environment in the country of origin.
Considering, therefore, that Article 8 has been recognised in appropriate cases as the means to achieve family reunification Judge McCloskey found that section 55 applied to the sponsor as he was 17 when the decision of the ECO has been made. Nonetheless the Secretary of State had not discharged her duty under section 55(2) to have regard to statutory guidance and the best interests of the child principle. According to Judge McCloskey such omission tends to be the rule rather than the exception in other similar cases.
At this juncture Judge McCloskey assess the status of unincorporated or partially incorporated international treaties in domestic law, concluding that several treaties, such as the UNCRC have progressively influenced domestic law via the Human Rights Act 1998. Moreover individual articles from international treaties such as Article 3(1) of the UNCRC cannot be considered in a vacuum instead treaty interpretation requires the object and purpose of the treaty to be taken into account. According to Judge McCloskey section 55 can be influenced by unincorporated provisions of international law by virtue of the Secretary of State’s guidance (whose status is derived from a duty imposed by primary legislation) which specifies that the requirements of, inter alia, ECHR, ICCPR, EU Reception Conditions Directive and UN CRC must be fulfilled when the UK Border Agency is exercising its functions. Therefore, the Secretary of State and her "alter egos", i.e UKBA, UKVI and ECO must give effect to international treaties when making immigration decisions which affect children. Moreover, Judge McCloskey notes that whilst the second appealant was outside the UK territory and therefore section 55 does not apply, the Secretary of State's Immigration Directorate Instruction invites ECOs to consider the statutory guidance. This argumentation is further reified by the lack of territorial limiation of section 55(2), unlike 55(1). Therefore, although the Secretary of State’s guidance includes treaties which are unincorporated in domestic legislation they, nonetheless, have indirect status in domestic law and should be given effect even where a child is outside the territory.
In his conclusion Judge McCloskey weighs the interests of the three family members against the public interest finding that the family’s separation is contrary to strong and stable societies, reduces the sponsors contribution to UK society, thus undermining public interest, and could give rise to a dangerous journey if the family reunification application were denied, exposing the sponsor to Article 3 risks and contrary to the rationale of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Noting that the Secretary of State is not under a duty to facilitate reunification for the family in the UK, Judge McCloskey nevertheless finds that, by virtue of the indirect reliance on international treaties, substantial weight should be given to the individuals’ family life rights in the proportionality exercise.
Countering arguments presented by the government were set in the aforementioned context of a blanket ban on family reunification for children refugees. Moreover argumentation relating to the pull factor which could be created if a breach of Article 8 were found as well as the additional pressure on publicly funded services was viewed by the Upper Tribunal as unsubstantiated and lacking any scientific detail.
Therefore the Upper Tribunal found that the ECOs decisions interfered disproportionality with the applicants’ right to respect for family life.
Outcome:
Appeals allowed under Article 8 ECHR.
Observations/comments:
Notwithstanding that the sponsor had turned 18 the Upper Tribunal refers to Section 55 of the 2009 Act as well as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.
For a commentary on the case please see: Free Movement Blog, Relatives of refugee child win appeal against refusal of entry, 20 May 2016.
Relevant International and European Legislation:
Cited National Legislation:
Cited Cases:
| Cited Cases |
| ECtHR - Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium, Application No. 13178/03 |
| UK - Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11, [2007] 4 All ER 15, [2007] 2 AC 167, [2007] 2 WLR 581 |
| ECtHR - Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer v. Netherlands, Application No. 50.435/99 |
| ECtHR - Botta v Italy, Application No. 153/1996/772/973 |
| ECtHR- Tuquabo-Tekle And Others v The Netherlands, Application no. 60665/00, 1 March 2006 |
| ECtHR - Gül v. Switzerland, Application no. 23218/94 |
| ECtHR - Sen v. the Netherlands, Application no. 31465/96, 21 December 2001 |
| United Kingdom - The Queen on the application of ZAT, IAJ, KAM, AAM, MAT, MAJ and LAM v. Secretary of State for the Home Department |
| ECtHR - Draon v France [2006] 42 EHRR 40 |