Case summaries
The case concerns the potential removal of a Syrian national of Armenian origin and Christian denomination from Greece to Türkiye under the EU-Türkiye Statement of 18 March 2026, following the rejection of his asylum claim on safe third country grounds. The Court struck out the Article 3 complaint concerning the risk of ill-treatment upon removal due to the cessation of risk. It found no violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 having regard to the multi-layered examination of the asylum claim and the reliance on the EU–Türkiye framework, assurances and supporting material, and held that the conditions of the applicant’s detention in a Greek police station amounted to a violation of Article 3 ECHR.
Regarding the return of a Turkish applicant from Greece to Türkiye, her account constituted a prima facie case of refoulement, shifting the burden of proof to the Greek Government after evidentiary standards from secret detention cases were applied. The return of the applicant without any individual assessment or access to remedies, despite her asylum request and risk of ill-treatment due to alleged links to opposition movements in Türkiye, amounts to a violation of Articles 3 and 13 ECHR.
The applicant’s unregistered detention at a border guard station, without legal basis, information on the reasons for her arrest, or access to judicial review, as part of a broader Greek pattern of unlawful returns, amounts to a violation of Article 5(1), (2) and (4) ECHR. Although the applicant failed to prove a real risk to life or inhuman or degrading treatment during her removal process – where she travelled by an inflatable boat with other migrants –, the absence of an effective remedy to challenge such risks amounts to a violation of Article 13 ECHR.
The Court of Justice held that defending personal interests against illegally acting non-state actors due to state corruption can be regarded as ‘political opinion’ under Directive 2011/95 if perceived as opposition by the persecuting actors.
The Federal Administrative Court found that Art. 3 of the Qualification Directive does not hinder Member States to allow parents and siblings, fulfilling the requirements for family members under Art. 2(j) of the Directive, to change their status of subsidiary protection into a refugee status which they derive from their minor sponsor.
In the context of cessation of refugee status under Article 11 (1)(e), the change in circumstances must remedy the reasons which led to the recognition of refugee status; a country of origin’s ability or inability to demonstrate that it can provide protection from acts of persecution constitutes ‘a crucial element’ in this assessment.
Mere social and financial support to the third country national is inherently incapable of either preventing acts of persecution or of detecting, prosecuting and punishing such acts and, therefore, cannot be regarded as providing the protection required by Article 11(1)(e). In order to determine whether the third-country national still has a well-founded fear of persecution, the existence of protection against acts of persecution should be considered when examining the change in circumstances.
In a case of an asylum application on the grounds of gender based persecution, supported by medical reports, the Belgian Council of State held that it belongs to the asylum authorities to investigate the origin of injuries, whose nature and seriousness imply a presumption of treatment contrary to article 3 ECHR and to assess the risks they reveal.
Without this assessment, the judge cannot legally conclude that the Applicant does not establish that he has been persecuted or has suffered serious harm or been subjected to direct threats of such persecution or harm.
The European Court of Human Rights ruled that the removal of families belonging to the Sikh religious minority to Afghanistan would not constitute a violation of Article 3 ECHR, as the applicants’ situation failed to reach the severity threshold required by this Article. Despite the fact that the Sikh community suffers from intimidation and intolerance within the Afghan society, the Court did not find that this group is the target of a practice of a systematic practice of ill-treatment, despite any difficulties they may be facing in the country.
The fact that an asylum applicant has already been persecuted in the past or has already suffered serious harm is a serious indication of the well-founded fear of the claimant, or of the real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there is good reason to believe that this persecution or serious harm will not happen again.
When an applicant has suffered female genital mutilation in her country of origin, there is a rebuttable presumption that she will again be the victim of such persecution because of her membership in the social group of Ivorian women.
When a national authority assesses the likely persecution of an applicant for religious purposes in case of return to his/her country of origin, the national authority must evaluate, inter allia, the way the applicant will live his/her faith in his/her country of origin. The Court found that because the applicant is of Hazara ethnic origin and he converted to Christianism in Switzerland, he might face persecution in violation of art. 3 ECHR in case of return to Afghanistan. The TAF did not assess with enough seriousness the consequences of the applicant conversion ex nunc.
A Member State is not required to issue a decision on its own responsibility under Dublin III when, in its capacity as the determining Member State, it found that there is no sufficient evidence to establish responsibility of another Member State. Domestic courts do not have to examine the application of the Dublin criteria ex proprio motu in the context of a review of the rejection of an application for international protection.
Religion is a broad concept that encompasses both internal elements of faith and an external component of manifestation. The applicant does not have to provide documentation and make statements on both elements but has to cooperate with the authorities and substantiate the reasons that his claim of persecution on the grounds of religion is true. The provision of the death penalty in national legislation could constitute an “act of persecution” on its own, provided that the penalty is actually enforced and regardless of whether the measure is considered important for reasons of public order in that country of origin.