Case summaries

This case concerned the argument that the decision of the Minister with regard to deciding whether to grant subsidiary protection must involve the same procedure as that which is applied in determining refugee status and that, in reviewing any such decision of the Minister, the courts must apply the same principles as apply to refugee determinations, rather than the principles that apply when reviewing the discretionary grant of humanitarian leave to remain or a decision as to non-refoulement. The Court held that nothing in the Procedures Directive required that the decision making process as to subsidiary protection should be the same as that for the refugee process, however if substantially new material was put forward in a subsidiary protection application it must be given a fair and reasoned consideration. The primary focus for deciding upon an application for subsidiary protection under the Qualifications Directive is on obtaining reliable and up to date country of origin information. It is not necessary for the Minister, in making such a decision, to engage in a dialogue with an applicant.

The Supreme Administrative Court defined the standard of proof of a “reasonable likelihood” of persecution and a “real risk” of serious harm. Where these criteria are met, the court must give precedence to international commitments and not apply the mandatory national rules of procedure (e.g. for an action that is out of time).

A decision to expel an applicant with post-traumatic stress disorder to Poland did not violate Art 3 ECHR. The Member States guarantee, in accordance with Art 15 of the Reception Conditions Directive, to provide asylum applicants with the necessary medical treatment. Only in very exceptional cases does an expulsion violate Art 3 ECHR, even less frequently in cases of expulsions under the Dublin II regulation.

The applicant, a Tunisian national, having served a sentence in Italy on the charge, among others, of criminal conspiracy, faced deportation from Italy to Tunisia, where he risked ill-treatment.

The Court found that the deportation of the applicant to Tunisia would constitute a violation of Article 3 ECHR. The absolute nature of Article 3 meant that the conduct of the applicant was irrelevant for the purposes of Article 3.

The Minister for Immigration and Asylum must, when making an assessment of whether the applicant is eligible for asylum where there is no internal protection alternative, take into consideration the general circumstances in that part of the country and the applicant’s personal circumstances at the time of the decision.

The House of Lords test in Januzi (see separate summary) for assessing internal protection was approved.  In assessing whether the proposed area of internal relocation was unreasonable or unduly harsh it was an error of law to require that the circumstances would result in a breach of Art 3 of the ECHR or that the circumstances will be worse than the circumstances experienced by anyone else in that country.

Currently every Sunnite and Shiite from Central and South Iraq is to be considered as a refugee within the meaning of Section 60 (1) Residence Act and the 1951 Refugee Convention, if he/she originates from a region with mixed denominations.

Returnees who originate from regions of mixed denominations cannot obtain internal protection in any part of Iraq.

No violation of Articles 3 of the Convention and Article 4 of Protocol 4 should the Applicant be removed to Afghanistan. This assessment was made in light of the personal circumstances of the Applicant and the overall context in Afghanistan.

The case concerns access to a remedy with suspensive effect by an asylum seeker, who claimed asylum at the French border, against a potential removal from France to a country where there is real reason to believe he would face the risk of being subjected to ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR.

Exclusion from refugee status on the grounds of serious non-political crimes is only permissible if the applicant still poses a threat. The Court found that an applicant from Turkey, who had been subject to past persecution, was not sufficiently safe from renewed persecution if returned.