Case summaries

If a Member Sate has issued a visa that enables an applicant to enter its territory and that visa has expired less than six months previously, that Member State is responsible for the examination of the applicant’s asylum application as long as the applicant has not left the territory of the EU Member States. In this case, the visa issued by Slovenian authorities expired only 5 days before the asylum application was made in France. Slovenia was, therefore, the responsible Member State under Art 9(4) Dublin Regulation.

Applying the guidance on assessing internal protection found in AH (Sudan) and Januzi (see separate summaries), it would be unduly harsh for an applicant to have to survive in the area of internal relocation through enforced prostitution even if this was widespread in the country of origin. An applicant’s individual vulnerability should be taken in to account in assessing internal protection.

The case concerns the extent to which decision-makers should take into account a change of circumstances or situation in the country of origin.

Art 10.1 (b) of the Qualification Directive guarantees wide reaching protection of the freedom of religion. However, merely belonging to the Ahmadiyya religious community does not justify the granting of refugee status.

Gender may be a feature defining a social group, so women can be a particular social group.

Violence, beating, and bullying constitute persecution, even if these acts are committed by the local community or individual members thereof.

It is vital to determine whether the applicant obtained help from the state when she requested it or whether there was a genuine (and not just theoretical) opportunity to seek protection.

This case concerned the argument that the decision of the Minister with regard to deciding whether to grant subsidiary protection must involve the same procedure as that which is applied in determining refugee status and that, in reviewing any such decision of the Minister, the courts must apply the same principles as apply to refugee determinations, rather than the principles that apply when reviewing the discretionary grant of humanitarian leave to remain or a decision as to non-refoulement. The Court held that nothing in the Procedures Directive required that the decision making process as to subsidiary protection should be the same as that for the refugee process, however if substantially new material was put forward in a subsidiary protection application it must be given a fair and reasoned consideration. The primary focus for deciding upon an application for subsidiary protection under the Qualifications Directive is on obtaining reliable and up to date country of origin information. It is not necessary for the Minister, in making such a decision, to engage in a dialogue with an applicant.

The Supreme Administrative Court defined the standard of proof of a “reasonable likelihood” of persecution and a “real risk” of serious harm. Where these criteria are met, the court must give precedence to international commitments and not apply the mandatory national rules of procedure (e.g. for an action that is out of time).

A decision to expel an applicant with post-traumatic stress disorder to Poland did not violate Art 3 ECHR. The Member States guarantee, in accordance with Art 15 of the Reception Conditions Directive, to provide asylum applicants with the necessary medical treatment. Only in very exceptional cases does an expulsion violate Art 3 ECHR, even less frequently in cases of expulsions under the Dublin II regulation.

The applicant, a Tunisian national, having served a sentence in Italy on the charge, among others, of criminal conspiracy, faced deportation from Italy to Tunisia, where he risked ill-treatment.

The Court found that the deportation of the applicant to Tunisia would constitute a violation of Article 3 ECHR. The absolute nature of Article 3 meant that the conduct of the applicant was irrelevant for the purposes of Article 3.

The seven day detention of a ‘temporarily admitted’ asylum seeker under the fast-track procedure was non-arbitrary and consistent with Article 5(1), but the 76 hour delay in providing the individual with the real reasons for his detention did not satisfy the promptness requirement of Article 5(2).