Case summaries

In this case the Court applied the CJEU’s decision in Elgafaji and the UK Court of Appeal’s decision in QD and AH (see separate summary on EDAL) and considered whether UK Immigration Tribunals had jurisdiction to consider Art 15 (c) in cases where removal directions had not been set. The specific issue concerned the risk of indiscriminate violence en route from Mogadishu to a safe area. It further considered and made important obiter comments on the ambit of Art 15 (c).

Refugee protection was not granted, since the applicant, as a member of the particular social group of "Djoula living in the South of  Côte d’Ivoire" (Art 10.1(d) Qualification Directive) was not subject to political persecution when he left Côte d’Ivoire in 2001. The court found that group persecution was not established due to the insufficient frequency of acts of persecution against members of this group and therefore in case of return, the applicant would not face such group persecution.

In appealing a decision to transfer the wife and children of an asylum applicant to Poland, the applicants relied on the humanitarian provision in Art 15 Dublin Regulation. They also noted Art 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation states separation of family members should be avoided and that such a separation would violate Art 8 ECHR. The Austrian Asylum Court allowed the appeal on the basis of Austrian asylum law, under which family members of an asylum applicant have the right to receive the same status as the applicant.

The accelerated procedure (in this case, applicants from a safe country of origin) guarantees the individual assessment of the applicant’s situation and their right to a remedy with suspensive effect.

Even if an asylum applicant meets the conditions for provding subsidiary protection, he will be excluded from eligibility for subsidiary protection if there are serious grounds for believing that he represents a danger to society or a danger to the Member State in which he is staying.

It follows from the decision of the European Court of Human Rights that signatory states to the Convention (Convention for theProtection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) are under an obligation not to hand over/deport a person to a country where he might be at risk of treatment which is contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. In the case in question, however, the subject of the judicial review was not the decision to deport the Appellant, but the Respondent’s decision not to grant asylum and not to provide subsidiary protection as requested by the Appellant.

The failure to respect the procedural guarantees provided under Article 3.4 of the Dublin II Regulation constitutes a serious and manifestly illegal infringement of the right of asylum.

The Family Reunification Directive does not make a distinction between whether a family relationship arose before or after the entry of the resident into the Member State. An application for family reunification may not be refused where the sponsor, the resident within EU territory, has proved that he has stable and regular resources which are sufficient to maintain himself and the members of his family, but who, given the level of his resources, will, nevertheless, be entitled to claim special assistance in order to meet exceptional, individually determined, essential living costs, tax refunds, or income-support measures.

Under Article 2 ECHR there can be no extradition of an individual if a serious risk of the death penalty is established. An applicant’s psychological suffering due to the fear of execution by authorities violates Article 3.

It is not open to a Contracting State to enter into an agreement with another State which conflicts with its obligations under the Convention.

No liability in damages in EU Law under Art 16(1)(b) of the Dublin Regulation arose from the failure to promptly examine an application for asylum where the United Kingdom accepted responsibility for the claim. The obligation in Art 13 of the Qualification Directive to grant refugee status to those entitled to it could not be considered a “civil right” protected by Art 6 of the ECHR in the absence of caselaw from the Strasbourg Court expressly recognising this.

The appellants argued that they were at risk of re-trafficking and would not find protection anywhere in Albania. The tribunal agreed, and laid down country guidance on the risks facing trafficked women and the absence of effective protection from these risks.