Case summaries
When establishing the necessary “density of danger” in an internal armed conflict within the meaning of Section 60 (7) (2) Residence Act/Art. 15 (c) Qualification Directive, it is not sufficient to quantitatively determine the number of victims in the conflict. It is necessary to carry out an “evaluating overview” of the situation, which takes into account the situation of the health system. However, this issue was not decisive in the present case, as the applicant would only face a low risk of being seriously harmed.
Appeal against the General Secretary of the Ministry of Public Order's negative decision no 95/52986 of 28.4.2006 on a claim for asylum before the Appeal Committees formed pursuant to Articles 26 & 32 of Presidential Decree 114/2010 and the Minister of Citizen Protection's decision 5401/3-505533 of 7.11.2011 (385/8-11-2011 FEK YODD) pursuant to which the present Committee was formed.
This case involved a fear of persecution because of religious beliefs (atheism) as well as because of membership of a particular social group (personality shaped in a non-Islamic society / westernisation). In particular, the Committee ruled that if the Applicant were to return to Afghanistan now or in the near future, because of his atheism and the consequent non-conformity with the Islamic way of life of the society into which he would need to integrate, in conjunction with the fact that his personality has been shaped in a non-Islamic society with customs and a way of life totally different from those of Muslims, he would be reasonably likely to suffer aggressive social attitudes, threats and social exclusion which, taken cumulatively, could amount to persecution. Besides, should he return to a small rural community in Afghanistan – given the Applicant's particular personality and how it had been shaped – it is very likely that he would not be able to conceal his religious beliefs (atheism) and thus there was a reasonable chance that he would be at risk of criminal prosecution because of his atheism and his 'apostasy' from Islam (prosecution which is reasonably likely to lead to imprisonment or execution). This, however, would constitute a direct and severe violation of his fundamental right to religious freedom, especially in the context of the specific social, religious and political unrest and the absence of legal guarantees in the Applicant's country of origin.
It was held that even if he were not criminally prosecuted, the Applicant would, in any case, be at risk of suffering harm from non-state actors in the form of persecution; and that the Afghan State, police and other authorities were incapable of providing adequate and effective protection, mainly because of the lack of organisation and the corruption which prevails at all levels.
The refusal to grant a right of residence to a third-country national who is a family member of a Union citizen must not lead in fact to the obligation for the latter to leave the territory not only of the Member State of which he is a national but also that of the Union as a whole.
When refusing a claim for asylum the decision-maker must establish beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant's fear is not well founded.
The Supreme Administrative Court considered the application of the internal protection principle. The Court held inter alia that effective protection cannot be provided by non-governmental organisations which do not control the state or a substantial part of its territory.
M’s detention pending deportation, for over 2 years and 8 months, was processed without sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness and delay, resulting in four separate violations of the Convention.
Subsidiary protection was granted to the applicant due to the lack of his family ties in Afghanistan on the basis of the risk of serious harm (torture and inhuman treatment).
This was an appeal against a decision to expel a widowed illiterate mother and five of her children who had been granted subsidiary protection in Bulgaria. Austria did not have to apply the sovereignty clause, as the situation in Bulgaria did not give rise to a real risk of a violation of Art 3 ECHR. Although the applicant’s sixth child had entered Austria and applied for asylum as an unaccompanied minor two years earlier, there was no violation of Art 8 ECHR because family reunification was possible in Bulgaria and there is no family life worth protecting.
This case concerned the meaning of the term “serious harm” in the Qualification Directive (as transposed into Irish law). The Irish state refused to grant the applicant subsidiary protection on the basis that the term imputes the absence of State protection, if the fear of harm is from non-state actors. The applicant argued that this was incorrect.
Refugee status was granted to a Kosovar family of Roma origin based on their ethnicity being recognised as a particular social group. The court found that they faced a risk of persecution and that state protection was either unavailable or ineffective.