Case summaries
In appealing a decision to transfer the wife and children of an asylum applicant to Poland, the applicants relied on the humanitarian provision in Art 15 Dublin Regulation. They also noted Art 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation states separation of family members should be avoided and that such a separation would violate Art 8 ECHR. The Austrian Asylum Court allowed the appeal on the basis of Austrian asylum law, under which family members of an asylum applicant have the right to receive the same status as the applicant.
No liability in damages in EU Law under Art 16(1)(b) of the Dublin Regulation arose from the failure to promptly examine an application for asylum where the United Kingdom accepted responsibility for the claim. The obligation in Art 13 of the Qualification Directive to grant refugee status to those entitled to it could not be considered a “civil right” protected by Art 6 of the ECHR in the absence of caselaw from the Strasbourg Court expressly recognising this.
An expulsion order in relation to an elderly woman with a deteriorating medical condition gave rise to a real risk of a violation of Art 3 and Art 8 ECHR. In light of this risk, the Asylum Court held that the sovereignty clause in the Dublin Regulation should be applied in combination with Article 15 of the same Regulation, even though the latter was not directly applicable in this case.
Detaining children in a closed centre designed for adults is unlawful and ill-suited to their extreme vulnerability, even though they were accompanied by their mother.
UK domestic legislation that deemed that EU member states were safe third countries for the purposes of removal under the Dublin Regulation was not, as a matter of course, incompatible with Article 3 ECHR and the Human Rights Act 1998. However, if the applicant could show that his or her rights under Article 3 ECHR would be breached by his or her removal to Greece, a declaration of incompatibility between the legislation and the Human Rights Act would be made, although the Court would be prevented from finding that the removal would breach the applicant’s rights. However, the evidence combined with the ECtHR’s ruling in KRS v. UK was not sufficient to indicate that there was such a risk and, in any event, the applicant could seek the protection of the ECtHR in Greece.
The fact that Poland agreed to take charge of the asylum procedure of a whole family is, by itself, not a proper basis for an inadmissibility decision. The hierarchy of the criteria for determining the Member State responsible for the procedure on the merits, set out in Art 5(1) Dublin II Regulation, must be respected. In this case the husband and father of the family had already been admitted to the procedure on the merits and, therefore, Art 8 was applicable prior to Art 14.
The conditions for asylum seekers in Greece were at the time of the decision not of such a character that it would prevent transferring asylum seekers according to the Dublin Regulation.
Traumatised people and those who have suffered otherwise psychologically and physically from flight behave differently when giving evidence compared with healthy people. This can mean that the full submissions relevant to asylum are not provided at the start of the proceedings or the traumatisation itself is not mentioned. These circumstances are to be taken into account during the ban on new evidence.
Although the applicant, an adult without children, did not fall within the definition of a family member under Art 2(i) Dublin Regulation and could therefore not rely on Art 7 and Art 8 to defeat a transfer order, his links to family members in France could justify applying Art 3(2) or Art 15. In such a case, the definition of a family member should not be interpreted in the restrictive sense of Art 2(i). In order to apply a broader definition, the applicant must provide evidence of the intensity of the links to the family. In this case, the applicant failed to provide such evidence.