Case summaries

In appealing a decision to transfer the wife and children of an asylum applicant to Poland, the applicants relied on the humanitarian provision in Art 15 Dublin Regulation. They also noted Art 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation states separation of family members should be avoided and that such a separation would violate Art 8 ECHR. The Austrian Asylum Court allowed the appeal on the basis of Austrian asylum law, under which family members of an asylum applicant have the right to receive the same status as the applicant.

The failure to respect the procedural guarantees provided under Article 3.4 of the Dublin II Regulation constitutes a serious and manifestly illegal infringement of the right of asylum.

An expulsion order in relation to an elderly woman with a deteriorating medical condition gave rise to a real risk of a violation of Art 3 and Art 8 ECHR. In light of this risk, the Asylum Court held that the sovereignty clause in the Dublin Regulation should be applied in combination with Article 15 of the same Regulation, even though the latter was not directly applicable in this case.

Art 3 and Art 15 Dublin Regulation are only applicable if there exist compelling reasons to believe the receiving country is incapable of welcoming asylum applicants in appropriate conditions or if the applicants can prove that they personally risk being subjected to ill treatment or not benefitting fully from an effective right to asylum. In this case, the applicants had not demonstrated they were personally victims of ill treatment in Poland. Poland was considered to offer sufficient guarantees against deportation and for an effective and impartial asylum procedure.

The Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) quashed a decision of the Finnish Immigration Service which, applying the Dublin II Regulation, did not examine the application for international protection and decided to return the applicant to Greece. The SAC returned the case to the Immigration Service for a new examination based on new evidence that was presented regarding the applicant’s health.

A decision to expel a child with a serious medical condition that may lead to death without treatment, to Poland, when that child has previously been refused medical treatment in Poland, gave rise to a real risk of a violation of Art 3 ECHR. The decision had been taken arbitrarily because the necessary investigations in relation to the child’s medical condition had not been made.

An intervention by the French urgent applications judge [juge des référés] on the grounds of urgency is not considered until a decision on a transfer of an asylum applicant under the Dublin Regulation has been made. In this case, the asylum applicant was not yet subject to a transfer decision and there was therefore no particular need for an urgent intervention within the 48-hour period, as provided by article L.521-2 of the French Code on Administrative Justice.  

UK domestic legislation that deemed that EU member states were safe third countries for the purposes of removal under the Dublin Regulation was not, as a matter of course, incompatible with Article 3 ECHR and the Human Rights Act 1998. However, if the applicant could show that his or her rights under Article 3 ECHR would be breached by his or her removal to Greece, a declaration of incompatibility between the legislation and the Human Rights Act would be made, although the Court would be prevented from finding that the removal would breach the applicant’s rights.  However, the evidence combined with the ECtHR’s ruling in KRS v. UK was not sufficient to indicate that there was such a risk and, in any event, the applicant could seek the protection of the ECtHR in Greece.

This case concerned the interpretation of Article 20(1)(d) and Article 20(2) of the Dublin Regulation and the analysis of time limits under these provisions when the Member State provides for suspensive effect of an appeal. The time limit for the period of implementation of the transfer begins to run, not as from the time of the provisional judicial decision suspending transfer but from the time of the judicial decision which rules on the merits of the procedure and which is no longer such as to prevent its implementation.

The applicant challenged his transfer to Greece from the UK under the Dublin II Regulation, on the basis that the situation for asylum seekers in Greece would lead to a violation of Article 3 ECHR. The Court declared the application manifestly ill-founded and therefore inadmissible, as it was presumed that Greece would comply with its obligations and would not refoule him to his county of origin Iraq.