Case summaries
The Dublin regulations do not allow for priority to be given to the processing of different types of transfer applications. In particular, there is no priority which favours a transfer application made on the Applicant’s own initiative as compared to one which is ordered by administrative compulsion. In deciding the application, the executing authority must allow the Applicant to transfer without administrative compulsion if it appears certain that (i) the Applicant will voluntarily travel to the Member State responsible for reviewing his application and, (ii) will report in a timely manner to the responsible authority. A transfer without administrative compulsion is not a deportation (Abschiebung), and therefore does not result in a statutory ban on entry and residence under Sec. 11 of the Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz).
A Member State is responsible for the asylum application of an unaccompanied minor if the minor does not have a family member in said Member State and the minor's application has been finally rejected in another Member State, provided that the unaccompanied minor resides in the relevant Member State.
The responsibility for examining an application does not cease to apply upon the mere acceptance of a request to take charge by another Member State.
This case concerns the interpretation of Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 when an unaccompanied child submits more than one asylum application in two Member States and does not have any family members present in the territories of the Member States. In such circumstances the CJEU held that the responsible Member State is the one in which the child is present after having lodged an asylum application there.
This case concerns the interpretation and application of Article 15 of the Dublin Regulation, commonly known as the humanitarian clause, in a specific set of circumstances where the asylum seeker concerned has a daughter in law who is seriously ill, and on account of cultural factors, at risk or has grandchildren below the age of majority, who, as a result of the daughter-in-law’s illness are in need of care and the asylum seeker concerned is both willing and able to support them. The CJEU held in circumstances such as those Article 15(2) must be interpreted so as to make that Member State responsible for the asylum seekers claim. This is applicable even if the Member State which was responsible pursuant to the criteria laid down in Chapter III of the Regulation did not make that request.
This case concerned the concept of ‘safe country’ within the Dublin system and respect for fundamental rights of asylum seekers. The Court held that EU law prevents the application of a conclusive presumption that Member States observe all the fundamental rights of the European Union. Art. 4 Charter must be interpreted as meaning that the Member States may not transfer an asylum seeker to the Member State responsible within the meaning of the Regulation where they cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of the provision. Once it is impossible to transfer the asylum seeker to the responsible Member State then subject to the sovereignty clause the State can check if another Member State is responsible by examining further criteria under the Regulation. This should not take an unreasonable amount of time and if necessary then the Member State concerned must examine the asylum application.
This case concerned the interpretation of Article 20(1)(d) and Article 20(2) of the Dublin Regulation and the analysis of time limits under these provisions when the Member State provides for suspensive effect of an appeal. The time limit for the period of implementation of the transfer begins to run, not as from the time of the provisional judicial decision suspending transfer but from the time of the judicial decision which rules on the merits of the procedure and which is no longer such as to prevent its implementation.