Case summaries
The case concerns seven Venezuelan nationals who arrived in Curaçao in April 2019 and were placed in immigration detention following refusal of entry and removal orders. The Court found a violation of Article 3 ECHR in relation to the use of force during their detention, the absence of an effective and independent investigation and the lack of justification for the use of rubber bullets against applicants in custody. It further found a violation of Article 5 § 4 ECHR, due to the lack of access to a speedy judicial review of the lawfulness of their detention, particularly due to the lack of accessible remedies, language barriers, and absence of effective legal assistance.
The situation in which an appeal by a foreigner against a detention decision is declared ‘without object’, solely on the ground that a new detention order has been issued, does not offer the guarantees of effectiveness and promptness required by article 5 §4 of the Convention.
The Court found no violation of the Convention given that the applicants would have had access to a genuine and effective possibility of submitting arguments against their expulsion had they entered lawfully into Spain – they did not have any “cogent reasons” for not using the border procedures available at designated entry points. As such, the lack of an individualised procedure for their removal was the consequence of their own conduct.
The CJEU ruled on the scope of the right to an effective remedy provided for in Article 39 of the Asylum Procedures Directive and in Article 13 of the Returns Directive.
The CJEU ruled on the scope of the right to an effective remedy provided for in Article 46 of the (Recast) Asylum Procedures Directive and in Article 13 of the Returns Directive.
NB: the case was referred to the Grand Chamber, which issued a new ruling on 13 February 2020. For the EDAL summary of the final judgment, see here.
The continued and exclusive control of contracting State's authorities over individuals creates, at least, a de facto exercise of jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR.
The CJEU ruled that the period of application of an entry ban under the Return Directive begins to run from the date on which the person concerned has actually left the territory of the Member States.
In order to protect the security of state and public order, it is justifiable to limit freedoms and rights, including the right to court. The right to court covers the possibility to access case files by the party of the proceedings as well as the possibility to get to know the motives of the decision and formulate allegations against them. When there is a need to protect the security of state and public order, the rights of the party of the proceedings are limited. The party cannot get to know the motives of the decisions and has to rely on the fair judgement of the authority.
The courts as well as the administrative authorities got to know the motives of the decision and had a possibility to verify them in the context of the legal conditions in return proceedings. Their assessment is binding and sufficient. Assessment of the authorities is subject to control of legality in administrative court proceedings, so it cannot be stated that the actions of the authority are out of control.
The Supreme Administrative Court rules that Article 12(1)2 of the Return Directive which allows for non-disclosure of certain facts of the return decision for the reasons of national security is a specific law applicable in return cases and to that extent it excludes the general safeguards envisaged in Article 47 of the Charter.
The right to be represented by a lawyer in the context of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 will only apply when an appeal to a return decision has been lodged and free legal assistance will be subject to national domestic legislation.
This CJEU ruling concerned the interpretation of Article 6 of Directive 2008/115/EC (‘the Return Directive’) in relation to the right to be heard prior to a return decision being made, to return illegally staying third-country nationals.
It was found that where the national authority had explicitly provided for the obligation to leave national territory in cases of illegal stay in its national legislation and the third-country national had properly been heard in the context of the procedure for examining his/her right to stay; the right to be heard did not require the applicant to be given an additional opportunity to present observations prior to the issue of a return decision.