Case summaries

The case concerned an application for judicial review of the decisions made on behalf of the Secretary of State to transfer the applicants to Malta, on the basis that such jurisdiction was the proper place for considering the applicants’ asylum claims. The applicants argued that such transfer would violate their rights under Article 18 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter) to have their asylum application determined within a reasonable time and on the basis of a fair procedure, as the Maltese asylum system had several shortcomings and contains procedures that are illusory or too slow. Dismissing the application, the Tribunal concluded that there was no evidence to support the argument that the applicants’ Article 18 rights would be violated if they were transferred to Malta. 

The Constitutional Court ruled that Member States are obliged to examine all circumstances which are important from the perspective of the principle of non-refoulement, when deciding on a Dublin transfer to a responsible Member State. Due to the absolute nature of the protection afforded by the principle of non-refoulement, the assessment must take into account all the circumstances of the particular case, including the applicant's personal situation in the transferring country. In this context, it should also be assessed whether the mere removal of an individual to another country due to their health status is contrary to the requirements arising from the principle of non-refoulement. Thus, when the Supreme Court did not consider the circumstances that are important in terms of respect of the principle of non-refoulement, it infringed the applicants' right to equal protection under article 22 of the Constitution.

The asylum applicant cannot be transferred to Bulgaria because he would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment pursuant to Article 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Hungary does not guarantee the respect of asylum procedures. The transfer must be halted in accordance with article 3 of the Dublin Regulation (EU) No 604/2013.

The judgment’s motivation must be based on more than one source if others are available.

The applicant had sufficiently established that if returned to Hungary under the Dublin Regulation he would not benefit from an examination of his asylum application in line with procedural guarantees as required by the right to asylum. Such a transfer decision thus violated Article 4 of the Charter.

A general circular letter send by Italian authorities is not a sufficient individual guarantee regarding a Dublin Transfer of a man suffering from various serious diseases.

A renewed application for asylum in a second country is admissible if the nature of international protection applied for differs from the protection already granted. Deportation to the country of the first application or the country of origin is not to be taken into account in this situation.

The High Court in this case focused on two questions: 1) whether the Refugee Appeals Tribunal’s (RAT) finding of a lack of a Convention nexus was valid, given the evidence before it, and 2) whether the RAT’s finding that the persecution faced by the applicant in the past does not amount to “compelling reasons” meriting a grant of refugee status was valid. The Court agreed with the Tribunal Member on the second question, finding that she had appropriately evaluated the applicant’s circumstances in light of the relevant guidelines, case law and evidence in rejecting the applicant’s claim for protection based on past persecution. However, the Court ultimately quashed the RAT’s decision in its findings on the first question, deducing that the RAT had failed to address all relevant aspects of the country of origin information that had been submitted by the applicant.

Asylum seekers cannot be rejected at the border crossing without having the possibility to state reasons for obtaining international protection as well as a precise indication of reasons for the refusal of entry on the entry form. An assessment of the submitted reasons for asylum cannot only depend on an assessment by an interpreter, but must be decided through the responsible authority or court.

In order to protect the security of state and public order, it is justifiable to limit freedoms and rights, including the right to court. The right to court covers the possibility to access case files by the party of the proceedings as well as the possibility to get to know the motives of the decision and formulate allegations against them. When there is a need to protect the security of state and public order, the rights of the party of the proceedings are limited. The party cannot get to know the motives of the decisions and has to rely on the fair judgement of the authority.

The courts as well as the administrative authorities got to know the motives of the decision and had a possibility to verify them in the context of the legal conditions in return proceedings. Their assessment is binding and sufficient. Assessment of the authorities is subject to control of legality in administrative court proceedings, so it cannot be stated that the actions of the authority are out of control.

The Supreme Administrative Court rules that Article 12(1)2 of the Return Directive which allows for non-disclosure of certain facts of the return decision for the reasons of national security is a specific law applicable in return cases and to that extent it excludes the general safeguards envisaged in Article 47 of the Charter.