Case summaries

In this application, the associations ask the Council of State to annul, for abuse of power, the decree n°2015-1329 of 21 October 2015 on the allowance granted to asylum seekers.

This decree is here annulled by the Council of State because its article 2 doesn’t provide for a sufficient additional amount for adult asylum seekers to allow them to seek private housing when they weren’t provided with an accommodation but had accepted material reception conditions. 

Switzerland is not the responsible Member State pursuant to Articles 6 and 8 of the Dublin III Regulation, since the unaccompanied minor lives in a foster family in the Netherlands and the Dutch authorities should take into consideration the factors of Article 6 (3) Dublin III Regulation, including the views of the minor. According to the court, Nidos (the guardianship institution for unaccompanied minors in the Netherlands) is an expert institution and its advice should be followed in assessing the best interest of the child.

Request to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling in the following issues:

1.       Transfer of responsibility to the requesting member state under the Dublin Regulations due to procedural delay

2.        Interlinked to this question is whether the plaintiff has a right to request a change of Member State’s responsibility.

3.        Additional questions concern compliance with the Dublin Regulations and its correct implementation, primarily                      relating to the point at which an application for international protection is deemed to be filed.

On the basis of CJEU jurisprudence, the administrative tribunal found that all asylum applicants have a right to appeal the manner in which the responsibility criteria of Dublin III has been applied to their individual case and the determination of a responsible Member State where there are systemic deficiencies. 

In this case, the Supreme Court allowed the State’s appeal against a High Court Judgment in which the Refugee Appeals Tribunal was found to have erred in law in its approach to determining persecution. The Supreme Court allowed the State’s appeal on the basis that the tribunal member’s finding of no risk of persecution was not unreasonable (within the applicable standards of judicial review) and that the High Court was incorrect in finding that the extent of educational discrimination at issue in this case met the threshold of persecution required.

The Supreme Court granted the cassation complaint lodged by the Polish Ombudsman in the case of a persecuted journalist forced to leave the country together with her son and accused of deception in order to obtain attestation of false information (in a form of a visa issued by a Consul). The Supreme Court agreed that there was a reasonable doubt with regard to the circumstances of the case and the guilt of the defendant. In the view of the Court, even if the defendant acted in a way which could be defined as deception in order to obtain attestation of false information, the circumstances of the case, the statements of the defendant and her clarifications should lead to a question whether the defendant could have acted in a state of necessity (i.e. the sole means by which she could have safeguarded an essential interest from a grave and imminent peril was to sacrifice another interest of lesser importance) while leaving the country.

The following question is referred to the CJEU under the expedited procedure provided for in Article 105 of the Rules of Procedure:

Does Article 26 of the Dublin Regulation III prevent the competent authorities in a Member State, who have requested another Member State to take responsibility under a take back or take charge request of an applicant who has applied for international protection (which has not yet been ruled definitely upon) or any other person caught by Article 18(1)(c) or (d), from taking a transfer decision and notifying the applicant before the requested State has accepted the take back or take charge request?

The applicants’ detention under Article 5 (1) was arbitrary and did not ensure the principle of legal certainty; lack of information was contrary to Article 5 (2) and impaired their ability to challenge the detention decisions in violation of 5 (4). The conditions at the reception centre and the boats did not amount to a violation of Article 3, as the applicants’ stay was very short and there were not sufficient indications.

There was no violation of Article 4 Protocol 4, as the applicants have had a genuine and effective possibility during the entire procedure to raise concerns regarding obstacles to their return to Tunisia; there was similarly no violation of Article 4 Protocol 4 in conjunction with Article 13, since the applicants’ complain would solely relate on the collective nature of their expulsion and not to any real risk of treatment contrary to Article 2 & 3 in Tunisia.

The Court quashed the decision of the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN) based on the fact that it did not meet its duty to actively provide the Applicant the possibility to resolve contradictions in his statements, as required by Article 16 of the Recast Procedures Directive (RPD).

Article 3 ECHR is triggered in cases involving the removal of a seriously ill individual where the absence of appropriate treatment in the receiving country or the lack of access to such treatment, exposes the individual to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his or her state of health resulting in intense suffering or to a significant reduction in life expectancy.

Access to sufficient and appropriate medical care must be available in reality, not merely in theory and the impact of removal on an applicant must be assessed by considering how an applicant’s condition would evolve after transfer to the receiving State.