Case summaries

The applicant, a Tunisian national, having served a sentence in Italy on the charge, among others, of criminal conspiracy, faced deportation from Italy to Tunisia, where he risked ill-treatment.

The Court found that the deportation of the applicant to Tunisia would constitute a violation of Article 3 ECHR. The absolute nature of Article 3 meant that the conduct of the applicant was irrelevant for the purposes of Article 3.

The applicant lodged an appeal before the Supreme Court against the High National Court’s decision to reject her asylum application. She claimed to have experienced persecution in Nigeria for religious reasons: her parents were killed in a religious confrontation between Muslims and Catholics. However, she did not explain how this fact was linked to a subsequent persecution. The Court held that the applicant was not a victim of religious persecution in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention, but that she had fled from a general conflict and a situation of political instability.

The Secretary of State for Justice does not have to give an applicant who submitted copies of documents of which he had the possibility of acquiring the originals before he left his country, an opportunity to submit these originals during the asylum process, regardless of the State’s duty to conduct research and cooperate with the applicant as determined in Art 8 of the Procedures Directive and Art 4 of the Qualification Directive.

Application for annulment of a decision by the Minister of Public Order 

The case concerned deportation of a recognized refugee (Articles 32 and 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees) after a conviction for a criminal offence under common law. Final conviction for a particularly serious crime is not sufficient legitimate justification for an act of deportation.; instead, the Administration is required to issue a specific ruling that the convicted refugee, given the circumstances under which he committed the offence and his personality, is thereafter a risk to the community as a whole to such an extent that his stay in Greece is no longer tolerable and that his immediate removal from the country is required.

A threat to the legal interests of public order does not constitute a reason to revoke refugee status as this is not explicitly referred to in the reasons for terminating refugee status in accordance with Article 1C of the 1951 Convention. Furthermore, it falls within the competence of the Council of State to annul a ruling, issued by relying on Articles 32 and 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, which involves the deportation of an alien who has been recognized as having refugee status under the said international Convention and who continues to have refugee status.

The case also considered the lack of competence of the body which issued the contested decision (General Secretary of the Ministry of Public Order instead of the competent Minister for Public Order). 

The seven day detention of a ‘temporarily admitted’ asylum seeker under the fast-track procedure was non-arbitrary and consistent with Article 5(1), but the 76 hour delay in providing the individual with the real reasons for his detention did not satisfy the promptness requirement of Article 5(2).

Homosexuals in Morocco form a social group within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention for reasons of common characteristics which define them in the eyes of Moroccan criminal law and society.

The Minister for Immigration and Asylum must, when making an assessment of whether the applicant is eligible for asylum where there is no internal protection alternative, take into consideration the general circumstances in that part of the country and the applicant’s personal circumstances at the time of the decision.

This case was an appeal against the decision of the Polish Refugee Board on refusal to accord refugee status on the grounds that the application was manifestly unfounded application, and on granting a permit for tolerated stay. The lack of grounds for an application does not mean that the case should not be examined on its merits.

When assessing a subsequent application, the authority may find that, in the framework of the new assertions of the interested party, the application is manifestly unfounded. The authority has the right to reach such a conclusion provided that the application is first examined in the context of its contents and in the context of the evidence cited by the Applicant.

The authority is also obliged to examine the case initiated by the subsequent application in light of the progress made, if any, in the case concerning the previously submitted (first) application for refugee status.