Case summaries

Malta’s failure to respect the minimum conditions set for asylum seekers creates a situation in which the requirements stipulated by Italian law for suspending transfers under the Dublin II Regulation can be considered to have been met when waiting for a final decision on an appeal against such a transfer.

This case concerned the legality of a circular in French law which was challenged by two organisations on the basis that it was contrary to EU Law under the Reception Conditions Directive in so far as it excludes asylum seekers from entitlement to allowances if they are in the Dublin procedure in France. The CJEU held that the Reception Conditions Directive applies in such a scenario and therefore asylum seekers in the Dublin procedure should have access to the minimum reception conditions laid down in that Directive. This obligation ceases when the person is actually transferred to another Member State.

This was an appeal against the decision to transfer an applicant to Hungary, when that applicant had first entered the EU through Greece. The argument that Greece’s formal responsibility for the applicant was “interrupted” by the applicant leaving the EU for a short term is contrary to Art 16(3) Dublin Regulation and must be dealt with by initiating procedures for a preliminary ruling at the CJEU. A preliminary ruling should also address the systemic failure of the asylum system in Greece, the risk of a violation of Art 3 ECHR and whether this results in a different Member State being responsible for the asylum procedure.

This was an appeal against the decision to transfer the applicant to Hungary on the ground that Hungary would transfer the applicant to Serbia, which would amount to indirect refoulement in violation of Article 3 ECHR. The Asylum Court allowed the appeal and held that, although Hungary can be assumed as a safe country, if an applicant gives individual reasons for why Hungary is not safe these must be examined in detail. 

This was an appeal against the decision to transfer the applicant to Hungary despite the applicant’s claim that he had first applied for asylum in Greece. The fact that there were no fingerprints on EURODAC did not prove the applicant had never been to Greece and according to Article 16(3) Dublin regulation Greece’s responsibility for the application would only expire if the applicant left the European Union for more than 3 months. However, since a deportation to Greece would violate Art 3 ECHR, the applicant should be admitted to the asylum procedure in Austria.

The Asylum Court rejected an appeal against the decision to expel the applicant, who has a medical condition, and her daughter to Italy. The situation in Italy was assumed to be in accordance with the Reception Conditions Directive and there was, therefore, no real risk of a violation of Art 3 ECHR. There was no violation of Art 8 ECHR as the applicant’s son had been living in Austria for 10 years, which meant there was no family life worth protecting.

The Asylum Court allowed an appeal against the decision to transfer the applicants, a family with both physical and psychological medical conditions, to Italy. Given the applicants’ exceptional circumstances and the problems Italy has with capacity, the lack of reliable assurances from the Italian authorities in relation to medical treatment and accommodation gave rise to a risk of a violation of Art 3 ECHR.

The asylum applicant who, in the case of a supervised departure, does not appear at the boarding of his/her flight where his/her pre-transportation to the airport was not ensured, cannot be considered as having absconded.

The case concerned detention and detention conditions in Greece for a Turkish asylum seeker of Kurdish origin, who had been tortured in Turkey, and the conduct of the asylum procedure.

The Administrative Court considered the removal of a Sri Lankan from the UK to Cyprus under the Dublin Regulation. The applicant had been recognised under UNHCR’s mandate as being a refugee in Malaysia but had subsequently travelled via Thailand, Syria and Cyprus to the UK. The Court found that there was no legitimate expectation under the UK’s Mandate Refugee policy to consider his claim in the UK. Further, applying the principles in MSS v Belgium and Greece and KRS v UK, it found that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he faced a risk of onward refoulement from Cyprus to Sri Lanka or that detention conditions or living conditions in Cyprus should prevent his removal.