Case summaries

Sweden is the responsible Member State pursuant to Articles 6 and 8 of the Dublin III Regulation, as the applicant is an unaccompanied minor and his father is legally residing in Sweden. According to the court, Nidos (the guardianship institution for unaccompanied minors in the Netherlands) is an expert institution and its advice should be followed in assessing the best interest of the child.

The case considered an application against the decision of the Secretary of State refusing to consider the merits of the Claimants’ contentions for asylum, on the basis that Hungary was considered to be a “safe” country that would presumably comply with its EU and international legal obligations. The Claimants argued that they would be at risk of refoulement to Iran if removed to Hungary, in breach of their rights under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Claimants further argued that along the way, they would be at risk of detention in conditions and circumstances amounting to an unlawful violation of their fundamental right to freedom and liberty under Article 5(1)(f) ECHR. The court held that removal of the Claimants to Hungary gives rise to a real risk of chain refoulement to Iran.  However, there was insufficient evidence to make out breach of Article 5 ECHR. 

The Court of Appeal concluded that the question of whether the time limitation for transfer of an applicant according to Article 29.1 Dublin III Regulation had expired is not relevant to determine the responsible Member State, and shall therefore not form part of the court’s examination of an appeal of a transfer decision under the Dublin III Regulation.

The Slovenian legislature has not fulfilled its obligations under the provisions of Article 2(n) of the Dublin Regulation. The possibility of an analogous application of Article 68 of the Aliens Act-2 has a very weak basis in terms of the objective criteria required. It can only be sufficient in a particular case if in light of the specific circumstances of the case there is no doubt about the existence of the risk of absconding.

 The transfer of “extra vulnerable” asylum seekers from the Netherlands to Italy is contrary to article 3 ECHR.

It is unlawful to transfer an asylum applicant under the Dublin Regulation to a country, in this case Bulgaria, where the reception conditions conflict with Article 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

The Applicants applied for asylum in Sweden, stating that they had arrived from Syria. However, investigations showed that the Applicants had entered Hungary via Serbia and applied for asylum in Hungary prior to arriving to Sweden. The Migration Court of Appeal found that the Hungarian asylum procedure and reception conditions did not contain such substantial deficiencies, that it was impossible to transfer the Applicants to Hungary in accordance with the Dublin III Regulation. However, two of the Applicants were small children, and had the Applicants been transferred to Hungary there was an imminent risk of lengthy waiting periods and a long period in custody before the Applicants could have their applications examined, which would have a considerable negative effect on the children’s health and development. Therefore, according to the Migration Court of Appeal a transfer of the Applicants under the circumstances was not consistent with the principle of the best interests of the children. With rejection of the Migration Agency’s complaint, the Applicants’ asylum applications were to be examined in Sweden.

The applicant’s asylum application was rejected in Croatia and he received an order to leave the country in 30 days. The Slovenian Asylum authority detained the applicant due to the risk of absconding, because he left Croatia before receiving a decision in his asylum procedure. The Court ruled that the applicant’s departure from Croatia was incorrectly assessed as arbitrary absconding (the applicant actually respected the order to leave the country) and therefore the applicant does not present a risk of absconding. The Court also held that the measure was not necessary, that the Asylum authority incorrectly referred to its discretionary powers in this matter and that the objective criteria to determine when someone presents the risk of absconding (from Article 68 of Aliens Act-2) have not been applied.

The Constitutional Court rules that the doubts of the Federal Administrative Court about the legality of Section 9a(4) and Section 21(9) FPG-DVO as amended by BGBl. II 143/2015, which defines the term “risk of absconding” in the context of detention pending deportation pursuant to Section 76 FPG, are unfounded. The Court finds that Section 9a(4) FPG-DVO was adopted on a sufficient legal basis. 

In order for a correct application of the responsibility determination procedure under Dublin III to take place the applicant must be able to contest a transfer decision and invoke an infringement of the rule set out in subparagraph 19(2) DR III, i.e. where the applicant provides evidence that he/she has left the territory of one Member State, having made an application there, for at least three months and has made a new asylum application in another Member State.