Case summaries

This case concerned the meaning of the term “serious harm” in the Qualification Directive (as transposed into Irish law). The Irish state refused to grant the applicant subsidiary protection on the basis that the term imputes the absence of State protection, if the fear of harm is from non-state actors. The applicant argued that this was incorrect.

Refugee status was granted to the applicants (parents) because of their advocacy in Afghanistan for democracy, separation of state and religion, equality between men and women, and their membership of and support for the party “Comprehensive movement for democracy and progress in Afghanistan”. Refugee status was granted to their children because of their membership of a particular social group of “family”.

Threats by political opponents are to be considered as imminent persecution by non-State actors according to Art. 60 (1) sentence 4 (c) of the Residence Act in conjunction with Art. 6 (c) of the Qualification Directive. The Afghan State is unwilling and unable to grant protection against such persecution by non-State actors (Art 7 of the Qualification Directive).

The applicant was recognised as a refugee because of a threat of forced marriage in Afghanistan. The court found that rights violations resulting from forced marriage, including the use of physical and psychological violence, constitute severe violations of basic human rights according to Art. 9 (1) (b) of the Qualification Directive. The applicant belonged to the particular social group of "unmarried women from families whose traditional self-image demands a forced marriage." The Afghan State is neither willing nor able to protect women against persecution in case of forced marriage. Internal protection was not available to the applicant.

The Council for Alien Law Litigation (CALL) held that Art 48/5, §3 of the Belgian Aliens Law, which refers to the principles of internal protection alternative and protection within a country of origin, is in principle applicable in cases where the threat comes from a non-state agent. In a case where the threat of persecution comes from a state agent, the decision-maker should explain why it believes that this provision is applicable nonetheless.

Women who are subjected to the norms and customary laws of FGM and forced marriage in rural areas in Nigeria cannot avail themselves of the protection of the State authorities, and their attitude is perceived as an infringement by the community members. They therefore form a social group within the meaning of Article 1 A (2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Furthermore, the impossibility of marrying another person constitutes an obstacle to leading a normal life in another part of the country and an alternative protection alternative cannot be considered. 

The Helsinki Administrative Court held that the applicant was not considered at risk of persecution as it was unlikely that the Iranian authorities were aware of the applicant’s extramarital affair and the applicant was able to rely on her friends for support in different parts of Iran.

The Helsinki Administrative Court held that the applicant was not considered at risk of persecution as it was unlikely that the Iranian authorities were aware of the applicant’s extramarital affair and the applicant was able to rely on her friends for support in different parts of Iran.

An unaccompanied minor from Mongolia was granted a residence permit on the gounds of “particularly distressing circumstances”. The Court held that the applicant would be in a very fragile and vulnerable position if returned as she was a minor without a family or a social network, she suffered from psychological problems and would be forced to live in an orphanage. The Court noted that child labour, child abuse and the sexual exploitation of children are problems in Mongolia and that it is a source and transit country for trafficking.

A young couple (both minors) were eligible for subsidiary protection as they risked being the victims of honour-related violence in their country of origin. The Migration Court of Appeal concluded that in this particular case, it would be unreasonable to ask the applicants to have sought the protection of domestic authorities.