Case summaries
This case concerned the meaning of the term “serious harm” in the Qualification Directive (as transposed into Irish law). The Irish state refused to grant the applicant subsidiary protection on the basis that the term imputes the absence of State protection, if the fear of harm is from non-state actors. The applicant argued that this was incorrect.
Young Nigerian women, especially those coming from the region of Benin City (State of Edo), who were forced to prostitute themselves in Europe in a transnational network of human trafficking, and who managed to extricate themselves from this network and to stop this forced activity, should not be seen as members of a particular social group in Nigeria. However, they face inhuman or degrading treatment in case of return to their country of origin and should therefore be granted subsidiary protection.
At issue in this case was whether the applicant qualified for subsidiary protection or protection for humanitarian reasons, considering her personal circumstances of extreme vulnerability.
Prostitutes who come from the State of Edo, and who are both victims of human trafficking and anxious to extricate themselves actively from these networks, form a group whose members are, by reason of these two common characteristics which define them, likely to be subjected to persecution within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, without being able to avail themselves of the protection of the Nigerian authorities. They are members of a particular social group.
Women who are subjected to the norms and customary laws of FGM and forced marriage in rural areas in Nigeria cannot avail themselves of the protection of the State authorities, and their attitude is perceived as an infringement by the community members. They therefore form a social group within the meaning of Article 1 A (2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Furthermore, the impossibility of marrying another person constitutes an obstacle to leading a normal life in another part of the country and an alternative protection alternative cannot be considered.
The case refers to an appeal before the High National Court brought by the Appellant against the decision of the Central Court for Contentious-Administrative Proceedings to uphold the Ministry of the Interior’s denial of asylum.
The Appellant is a Nigerian national.In the application she claimed that when her father died, she was left in debt to the chief of the tribe to which they belonged.In order to settle the debt, the Applicant was forced to marry the tribal chief and was kept as a prisoner.
Therefore, the High National Court upheld the Applicant’s appeal as it deemed the situation suffered by women in Nigeria, and particularly forced marriage, constitutes a form of persecution for membership of a particular social group.
The case concerned a single mother with no education or social network in Nigeria who, together with her daughter, was granted a residence permit because of "particularly distressing circumstances". The applicant was granted permanent residence as she was expected to have difficulty providing for herself and her daughter on return, and thereby risked being forced into prostitution.
The cases concerned two important issues: whether the processing of the refugee applications had been unlawfully accelerated or prioritised on the basis that the applicants were Nigerian, and whether the applicants were deprived of an effective remedy against the first instance determinations of the applications which was in compliance with Chapter V of the Procedures Directive. The Court found that Article 23(3) of the Procedures Directive permitted prioritisation/acceleration of any category of case and that the refugee appeals procedure in Ireland satisfied Article 39 of the Procedures Directive.
Based on new evidence (suspicion of trafficking) the Administrative Court returned the applicant’s case to the Immigration Service which had previously decided that Italy was responsible for the application according to the Dublin II Regulation.