ECtHR - Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v The United Kingdom, Application nos. 9214/80; 9473/81 and 9474/81, 28 May 1985
| Country of applicant: | Malawi Philippines United Kingdom , |
| Court name: | European Court of Human Rights |
| Date of decision: | 28-05-1985 |
| Citation: | Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v the United Kingdom [1985] ECtHR, Application nos. 9214/80; 9473/81; 9474/81 |
Keywords:
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Effective remedy (right to)
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Description
A general principle of EU law now set out in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights: "Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article.” “[It] is based on Article 13 of the ECHR: ‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.’ However, in Community law the protection is more extensive since it guarantees the right to an effective remedy before a court. The Court of Justice enshrined the principle in its judgment of 15 May 1986 (Case 222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651; see also judgment of 15 October 1987, Case 222/86 Heylens [1987] ECR 4097 and judgment of 3 December 1992, Case C-97/91 Borelli [1992] ECR I-6313. According to the Court, this principle also applies to the Member States when they are implementing Community law. The inclusion of this precedent in the Charter is not intended to change the appeal system laid down by the Treaties, and particularly the rules relating to admissibility. This principle is therefore to be implemented according to the procedures laid down in the Treaties. It applies to the institutions of the Union and of Member States when they are implementing Union law and does so for all rights guaranteed by Union law.” |
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Family unity (right to)
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Description
“In the context of a Refugee, a right provisioned in Article 23 of Council Directive 2004/83/EC and in Article 8 of Council Directive 2003/9/EC obliging Member States to ensure that family unity can be maintained. Note: There is a distinction from the Right to Family Life. The Right to Family Unity relates to the purpose and procedural aspects of entry and stay for the purpose of reuniting a family, in order to meet the fundamental right enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.” “A right to family unity is inherent in the universal recognition of the family as the fundamental group unit of society, which is entitled to protection and assistance. This right is entrenched in universal and regional human rights instruments and international humanitarian law, and it applies to all human beings, regardless of their status. ….Although there is not a specific provision in the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the strongly worded Recommendation in the Final Act of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries reaffirms the ‘essential right’ of family unity for refugees.” |
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Race
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Description
One of the grounds of persecution specified in the refugee definition according to Article 1A ofthe1951 Refugee Convention. According to the UNHCR: “Race, in the present connexion, has to be understood in its widest sense to include all kinds of ethnic groups that are referred to as “races” in common usage. Frequently it will also entail membership of a specific social group of common descent forming a minority within a larger population. Discrimination for reasons of race has found world-wide condemnation as one of the most striking violations of human rights. Racial discrimination, therefore, represents an important element in determining the existence of persecution.” According to the Qualification Directive the concept of race includes in particular considerations of colour, descent, or membership of a particular ethnic group. |
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Nationality
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Description
One of the grounds of persecution specified in the refugee definition per Article 1A ofthe1951 Refugee Convention. Nationality can be defined generally as the legal bond between a person and a State which does not indicate the person's ethnic origin. According to the Qualification Directive, when considered as a reason for persecution, the concept of nationality is not confined to citizenship or lack thereof and, in particular, includes membership of a group determined by its cultural, ethnic, or linguistic identity, common geographical or political origins or its relationship with the population of another State |
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Discrimination
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Description
Any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms. |
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Family member
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Description
"Generally, persons married to a migrant, or having a relationship legally recognised as equivalent to marriage, as well as their dependent children and other dependants who are recognised as members of the family by applicable legislation. In the context of the Family Reunification Directive 2003/86/EC (and 2003/109/EC, Long-Term Residents), a third-country national, as specified in Article 4 of said Directive and in accordance with the transposition of this Article 4 into national law in the Member State concerned, who has entered the EU for the purpose of Family Reunification… In the context of Asylum, and in particular Council Regulation (EC) 343/2003 (Determining responsible Member State for Asylum claim), this means insofar as the family already existed in the country of origin, the following members of the applicant's family who are present in the territory of the Member States: (i) the spouse of the asylum seeker or his or her unmarried partner in a stable relationship, where the legislation or practice of the Member State concerned treats unmarried couples in a way comparable to married couples under its law relating to aliens; (ii) the minor children of couples referred to in point (i) or of the applicant, on condition that they are unmarried and dependent and regardless of whether they were born in or out of wedlock or adopted as defined under the national law; (iii) the father, mother or guardian when the applicant or refugee is a minor and unmarried." |
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Family reunification
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Description
"The establishment of a family relationship which is either: (a) the entry into and residence in a Member State, in accordance with Council Directive 2003/86/EC, by family members of a third-country national residing lawfully in that Member State (""sponsor"") in order to preserve the family unit, whether the family relationship arose before or after the entry of the sponsor; or (b) between an EU national and third-country national established outside the EU who then subsequently enters the EU." |
Headnote:
The ECtHR held that the 1980 UK Immigration Rules breached ECHR Article 14 taken together with Article 8 as they discriminated on the ground of sex against three female applicants settled in the UK who wished to be joined by their spouses. It was easier for men settled in the UK to be joined by a non-national spouse than women but no objective and reasonable justification was found for this difference of treatment.
Facts:
The three applicants, all with indefinite leave to remain the UK, had husbands who under the 1980 Immigration Rules had been refused the right to join their wives in the UK or to remain with them there. All three marriages had taken place after the applicant had settled in the UK. Under the 1980 rules, there were different, stricter rules for non-British husbands joining wives in the UK than for wives joining husbands. On this account the applicants submitted that they had been victims of a practice of discrimination on the grounds of sex, race, and also in the case of Mrs Balkandali, birth, thus meaning that Article 3 and Article 8, alone or in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, had been violated. They also submitted that Article 13 had been violated as there was no effective domestic remedy to these claims.
Decision & reasoning:
Firstly, Article 8 of the convention was found to be applicable. Although by guaranteeing the right to respect for family life Article 8 ‘presupposes the existence of a family’ (Marckx v Belgium), and the ‘family’ in question did not yet exist at the time of the women’s settlement in the UK, the Court held that all intended family life is not automatically outside the ambit of Article 8. ‘Family’ must include a lawful, genuine and committed married relationship like those of the applicants.
However, there was not found to be a violation of Article 8. The Court held that Contracting Parties enjoy a wide margin of appreciation with regard to ‘respect for family life’ and that the situation also concerned immigration: it has long been established that States may control the entry of non-nationals onto their territory. Article 8 cannot be seen as a general obligation on a Contracting Party to respect the choice by married couples of the country of residence and always accordingly to accept the non-national spouses for settlement on their territory. The applicants did not show that there were special circumstances which would have prevented them from establishing family life in their own or their husbands’ home countries and moreover knew or should have known at the time of marriage that it would be likely that their husbands’ requests for settlement would be refused.
With regard to the alleged violation of Article 14 taken together with Article 8, there was found to be a violation, i.e. discrimination, on the ground of sex. While there was no dispute that under the 1980 Rules it was easier for a man settled in the UK to obtain permission for his spouse to enter or remain in the country, the Government claimed there was an objective and reasonable justification. They argued that the difference of treatment was to limit ‘primary immigration’ as the domestic labour market was experiencing high unemployment as male immigrants would have a greater impact on the market. The Court accepted that this aim was legitimate, and that again Contracting Parties enjoy some margin of appreciation in this area, but held that equality of the sexes is one of the major goals in the member states and thus that more convincing reasons would be needed to justify this difference of treatment. A modern view on the role of women should be taken and the impact on the domestic labour market of women immigrants should not be underestimated. The aim of advancing public tranquility also proposed by the Government was also held not the be served by the distinction drawn between men and women in the 1980 Rules. Finally, the more general argument that the UK had acted more generously in some areas than required by the Convention by admitting non-national wives was rejected because this does not preclude the discrimination in question. So Articles 14 8 had been violated on the ground of sex.
There was not found to be a violation of Articles 14 8 with regard to discrimination on the ground of race. Most immigration policies differentiate on the basis of nationality and therefore indirectly by race; the Court held that it was not racial discrimination to give preferential treatment to persons from countries with which a State has the closest links. The 1980 Rules indeed even included a specific instruction to immigration officers to carry out their duties without regard to race (paragraph 2).
There was also no violation of Articles 14 8 with regard to discrimination on the ground of birth (as alleged by Mrs Balkandali). The Court held that the aim of avoiding the hardship of women with close ties to the UK having to move abroad to remain with their husbands was legitimate. There are also persuasive social reasons for giving special treatment to those whose link with a country stems from birth.
The Court also held there was no violation of Article 3. The difference of treatment did not show any lack of respect for the personality of the applicants and caused them no humiliation, simply being designed to achieve the aims stated above.
There was found to be a violation of Article 13 as, due to the UK having not incorporated the Convention into its domestic law, there was no ‘effective remedy’ to the discrimination on the ground of sex in the 1980 Rules. The channels of complaint available could only be used if the discrimination resulted from the 1980 Rules being misapplied.
Finally, under Article 50 it was held that the applicants could not receive monetary compensation as the findings of violation themselves are sufficient satisfaction. However, costs and expenses were to be reimbursed, the Government indicating that they were prepared to cover costs in accordance with Court practice.
Outcome:
Application granted with regard to violation of article 14 taken together with article 8 granted on ground of sex and with regard to violation of article 13 again granted in regard to discrimination on ground of sex. The application for reimbursement of costs and expenses as calculated was also granted. Application with regard to violation of article 8 alone, article 3 and article 14 taken together with article 8 with regard to discrimination on grounds of race and birth denied.
Subsequent proceedings:
This case was closed by the Committee of Ministers in Resolution DH (86) 2.
Observations/comments:
This case summary was written by Tabatha Pinto, GDL student at BPP University
Relevant International and European Legislation:
Cited National Legislation:
Cited Cases:
| Cited Cases |
| ECtHR - Airey v Ireland, 9 October 1979, Series A No. 32 § 26 |
| ECtHR - Marckx v Belgium, 13 June 1979, § 41, Series A No. 31 |
| ECtHR - Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom, Nos. 7601/76 7806/77, 18 October 1982 |
| ECtHR - Belgian Linguistic Case (A/6) |
| R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Hosenball [1977] 3 All England Law Reports 452 |
| ECtHR - National Union of Belgian Police v Belgium (application no. 4464/70), 27 October 1975, Series A no. 6 |
| ECtHR - Rasmussen v Denmark (application no. 8777/79), 28 November 1984 |
| ECtHR - Silver and Others v United Kingdom (application no. 6205/73), 25 March 1983, Series A no. 61 |
| ECtHR - Campbell and Fell v United Kingdom (application nos. 7878/77; 7819/77), 28 June 1984, Series A no. 80 |
| ECtHR - Zimmerman and Steiner v Switzerland (application no. 8737/79), 13 July 1983, Series A no. 66 |
Follower Cases:
Other sources:
European Court of Human Rights, Rules of Court, Rules 21 paras. 3(b), 4 and 5, 30, 33 para. 3 (d) and 37 para. 1