Case summaries
HIV-related marginalisation and discrimination can reach the threshold of seriousness to establish persecution but is not sufficient to be granted international protection. In order to benefit from international protection, it must be established that there are personal reasons for a well-founded fear of being persecuted due to HIV-contamination. In this context, seropositivity can be regarded as being part of a social group, which is a valid persecution ground. In the case at hand, the Court took into account aspects of vulnerability which are unrelated to HIV-status.
Following the careful examination of International, European and domestic law, the Court concluded that the grant of refugee status supersedes any order made by a Family Court (regarding the return of the child to Pakistan), because it is the Secretary of State for the Home Department that is the entrusted public authority to deal with asylum matters. However, were the Family Court to discover new facts, the relevant public authority would be responsible, in principle, under the tenets of UK Administrative Law to review their decision.
Article 1F of the Refugee Convention relates to the application of a definition and not whether an individual seeking asylum should obtain protection or not. Therefore, and with regards to Article 1F(b), any post-offence conduct does not serve to mitigate the seriousness of an alleged non-political offence. No doctrine of expiation is to, thus, be applied to Article 1F(b).
The term serious used in Article 1F(b) denotes especially grave offending and requires no further qualification by the term “particularly."
The judgment concerns the scope of Article 21 of Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 with regards to derogation from protection from refoulement and the possibility to revoke a residence permit issued to a refugee pursuant to Article 24 of said Directive.
The Appellant appealed to the Upper Tribunal on the ground that he qualified for subsidiary protection under Article 2(e) and (f) of the Qualification Directive and was therefore entitled to a residence permit under Article 24(2) of the Qualification Directive.
In dismissing the appeal, the Tribunal found that: (a) Article 24 of the Qualification Directive does not confer a substantive right of residence in the member state concerned but rather its function is to determine the modalities whereby a right of residence otherwise existing is to be documented, and (b) the Procedures Directive is a truly adjectival instrument of EU legislation which does not create any substantive rights in the realm of asylum or subsidiary protection.
A transfer in accordance with the Dublin Regulation does not require the Swedish Migration Board to investigate ex officio whether there are deficiencies in the asylum system in Italy. The transfer does, however, breach the right to a family life, in accordance with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
A Russian Federation citizen, originally from Chechnya, had applied for international protection in Finland due to threat of persecution based on his/her family’s political activities. The Applicant had been diagnosed with post traumatic stress disorder because of torture. According to the Immigration Service, he/she could resort to internal relocation as specified in Section 88e of the Aliens Act and there were no grounds for granting international protection. The Administrative Court rejected the appeal. The Supreme Administrative Court took the view that the Applicant has had close ties to the Komi Republic and had no problems with the authorities while living there. Therefore he/she can be expected to rely on internal relocation to another part of the country, as specified in Article 88e of the Aliens Act and he/she was not in need of international protection.
Applications for leave to remain were rejected as the Applicant had already been granted refugee status in another EU state. No grounds supporting an examination of the asylum applications in Sweden emerged in the case.
A Gambian asylum seeker’s account of approximately eight years’ imprisonment and torture there was not considered credible. The Immigration Service and the Helsinki Supreme Administrative Courtconsidered the application to be manifestly unfounded and the Supreme Administrative Court did not give leave to appeal on the matter. The UN Committee against Torture had, however, requested that the Applicant not be returned to his home country, The Gambia, until UNCAT had examined the complaint.
A recognised refugee may only be refused a residence document if there are serious grounds to consider that he is a danger to the security of the Federal Republic of Germany.
The question as to whether a refugee should be refused a residence document because he supports a terrorist organisation can only be determined following a comprehensive, specific verification of the activities of the organisation and the foreign national based on an overall evaluation by the trial judge (following the decision of 15 March 2005 – Federal Administrative Court 1 C 26.03 - Federal Administrative Court 123, 114).