Case summaries

The case concerns the potential removal of a Syrian national of Armenian origin and Christian denomination from Greece to Türkiye under the EU-Türkiye Statement of 18 March 2026, following the rejection of his asylum claim on safe third country grounds. The Court struck out the Article 3 complaint concerning the risk of ill-treatment upon removal due to the cessation of risk. It found no violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 having regard to the multi-layered examination of the asylum claim and the reliance on the EU–Türkiye framework, assurances and supporting material, and held that the conditions of the applicant’s detention in a Greek police station amounted to a violation of Article 3 ECHR.

The safe third country ground under Article 33(2)(c) of Directive 2013/32 is optional; an application may be declared inadmissible on that basis even if the applicant qualifies for international protection, but it cannot be rejected as unfounded on that ground.

Article 38 requires national law to define criteria establishing a sufficient connection between the applicant and the third country to make transfer reasonable.

Article 38(2)(b) and (c) of Directive 2013/32 permits reliance on publicly available sources and executive lists of safe third countries, provided that national law sets out a methodology for an individualised assessment of safety and allows the applicant to challenge the existence of the required connection.

Courts hearing appeals must verify the existence of such a connection, even if national law does not expressly grant that power.

The removal of the author to Greece would amount to a breach of Articles 2 (c)-(f), 3, and 12 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, because the Swiss authorities failed to consider her vulnerable status as a survivor of gender-based violence (GBV) and the real, personal, and foreseeable risk that the author would face as an unaccompanied victim of such violence and suffering from PTSD and depression.

The Committee, invoking the principle of non-refoulement and recognising gender-based violence as discrimination under Article 1 of the Convention, determined that removing the author to Greece would violate Articles 2 (c)-(f), 3, and 12 of the Convention due to the state party's failure to conduct an individualized, gender-sensitive, and trauma-informed assessment of the real and foreseeable risks the author faces as a woman experiencing gender-based violence.

Regarding the return of a Turkish applicant from Greece to Türkiye, her account constituted a prima facie case of refoulement, shifting the burden of proof to the Greek Government after evidentiary standards from secret detention cases were applied. The return of the applicant without any individual assessment or access to remedies, despite her asylum request and risk of ill-treatment due to alleged links to opposition movements in Türkiye, amounts to a violation of Articles 3 and 13 ECHR.

The applicant’s unregistered detention at a border guard station, without legal basis, information on the reasons for her arrest, or access to judicial review, as part of a broader Greek pattern of unlawful returns, amounts to a violation of Article 5(1), (2) and (4) ECHR. Although the applicant failed to prove a real risk to life or inhuman or degrading treatment during her removal process – where she travelled by an inflatable boat with other migrants –, the absence of an effective remedy to challenge such risks amounts to a violation of Article 13 ECHR.

The Committee against Torture decided that the removal of the complainant, a (former) Turkish national, from Sweden to Kosovo, where he would face a real risk of being forcibly transferred to and subjected to torture in Türkiye, would constitute a violation of article 3 of the Convention.

The CJEU found that national legislation cannot introduce a new inadmissibility ground for applications for international protection that is not already included in the list of inadmissibility grounds in Directive 2013/32. In addition, the CJEU ruled that the so-called “Stop Soros” law which aimed at restricting and criminalizing persons or organizations providing assistance to applicants for international protection also breached EU law.

The CJEU ruled that Articles 14 and 34 of the Recast Qualifications Directive must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides that a failure to comply with the obligation to give a personal interview to an international protection’s applicant, before a decision is adopted, would lead to that application to be inadmissible.

The CJEU further concluded that it could only be allowed if the legislation gives the opportunity to the international protection’s applicant, in the appeal procedure, to set out in person all of his or her arguments against the decision in a hearing which complies with the applicable conditions and fundamental guarantees, under Article 15 of that Directive. The last condition would be, according to the ruling of the CJEU, that those arguments are not capable of altering that decision.

1. A change of the destination country in a return decision by an administrative authority should be regarded as a new return decision requiring an effective remedy in compliance with Article 47 CFREU.

2. The national legislation providing for a safe transit country ground applicable in the present case is contrary to EU law.

3. The obligation imposed on a third-country national to remain permanently in a closed and limited transit zone, within which their movement is limited and monitored, and which the latter cannot legally leave voluntarily, in any direction whatsoever, constitutes a deprivation of liberty, characterised as "detention" within the meaning of the Reception Conditions (RCD) and Returns Directives (RD).

4. Neither the RCD nor Article 43 of the Asylum Procedures Directive authorise detention in transit zones for a period exceeding four weeks.

5. Detention under the RCD and the RD must comply with the relevant guarantees under EU law including being based on a reasoned detention decision; consisting of a measure of last resort, following an individualised assessment of the case, its necessity and proportionality; and effective judicial review should be available. An applicant for international protection cannot be held in detention solely on the ground that they cannot support themselves. Where detention is found to contravene EU law, domestic courts may release the applicant and order the authorities to provide accommodation in line with the RCD provisions. They are empowered to do so, even if they have no clear jurisdiction under national law.

When State Parties do not examine an application for international protection in its mertis based on a safe third country clause, Article 3 still requires that they apply a thorough and comprehensive legal procedure to assess the existence of such risk by looking into updated sources regarding the situation in the receiving third country. Hungary violated Article 3 by failing to conduct an efficient and adequate assessment when applying the safe third country clause for Serbia.

Article 5 cannot be considered as ratione materiae applicable to the Röszke transit zone; the applicants' stay there involved a short waiting time in order for Hungary to verify their right to enter, they had entered on their own initiative and they were free to leave the area in the direction of Serbia. The conditions in the transit zone were not found to breach Article 3 because of the restrictive measure's short duration, the possibility for human contact and the applicants' awareness of the procedure.