Case summaries

The applicant had sufficiently established that if returned to Hungary under the Dublin Regulation he would not benefit from an examination of his asylum application in line with procedural guarantees as required by the right to asylum. Such a transfer decision thus violated Article 4 of the Charter.

The case considered an application against the decision of the Secretary of State refusing to consider the merits of the Claimants’ contentions for asylum, on the basis that Hungary was considered to be a “safe” country that would presumably comply with its EU and international legal obligations. The Claimants argued that they would be at risk of refoulement to Iran if removed to Hungary, in breach of their rights under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Claimants further argued that along the way, they would be at risk of detention in conditions and circumstances amounting to an unlawful violation of their fundamental right to freedom and liberty under Article 5(1)(f) ECHR. The court held that removal of the Claimants to Hungary gives rise to a real risk of chain refoulement to Iran.  However, there was insufficient evidence to make out breach of Article 5 ECHR. 

The Slovenian legislature has not fulfilled its obligations under the provisions of Article 2(n) of the Dublin Regulation. The possibility of an analogous application of Article 68 of the Aliens Act-2 has a very weak basis in terms of the objective criteria required. It can only be sufficient in a particular case if in light of the specific circumstances of the case there is no doubt about the existence of the risk of absconding.

In assessing asylum applications, national authorities are entitled to consider material contained in the files of third parties. In reviewing such cases, national courts will be under a duty to consider the same material. This does not conflict with the applicant’s right to confidentiality. 

An asylum seeker who was interviewed by telephone during his detention in the waiting zone by an officer of the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) in premises which were not subject to OFPRA’s director general’s prior approval has not benefited from the appropriate procedural guarantees attached to the examination of his application.

Consequently, the Ministry of Interior’s order rejecting Mr D’s request to enter the French territory, which was taken in light of an OFPRA opinion given in such circumstances, must be annulled.

This case dealt with the issue of whether the Secretary of State’s certification of the asylum claims of the two independent applicants as “clearly unfounded” was flawed on public law grounds, and the important difference between a decision on refugee status itself and a decision on a claim being “clearly unfounded”.
 

The Royal Decree of 11th May 2015 was quashed to the extent that it included Albania in the list of "safe" countries for the purposes of article 57/6/1, paragraph 4, of the law of 15th December 1980.

The application for international protection by a Syrian national was declared inadmissible based on the finding that Egypt was a Safe Third Country for the applicant. The Court of the Hague concludes that the State Secretary has failed to substantiate his claim that Egypt could be considered a Safe Third Country. 

The lower court had erred in law by judging that the administration need not justify having informed the applicant about the possibility to communicate with a  representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

The Supreme Administrative Count in the case concerning housing for a refugee ruled that the applicant, as a refugee, has found herself in a very specific situation, which was not taken into account by the authority. The applicant was not able to submit all the documents and information about the members of the family who stayed in Chechnya in order to obtain housing. It is beyond any doubt that the applicant and her children cannot live with their relatives, because other members of their family are in Chechnya, so the missing information could not have had any influence on the case whatsoever.

The Supreme Administrative Court found that it is the authority which is obliged to establish all the facts and find the objective truth. Although the local act imposes an obligation on the applicant to present concrete evidence, it cannot be stated, that justifiable problems with completing the evidence by the applicant exempted the authority from its own obligation to examine the case and enabled to automatically dismiss the application. Such an understanding would be inconsistent with article 6 of the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees.