Case summaries

The case concerns the potential removal of a Syrian national of Armenian origin and Christian denomination from Greece to Türkiye under the EU-Türkiye Statement of 18 March 2026, following the rejection of his asylum claim on safe third country grounds. The Court struck out the Article 3 complaint concerning the risk of ill-treatment upon removal due to the cessation of risk. It found no violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 having regard to the multi-layered examination of the asylum claim and the reliance on the EU–Türkiye framework, assurances and supporting material, and held that the conditions of the applicant’s detention in a Greek police station amounted to a violation of Article 3 ECHR.

The safe third country ground under Article 33(2)(c) of Directive 2013/32 is optional; an application may be declared inadmissible on that basis even if the applicant qualifies for international protection, but it cannot be rejected as unfounded on that ground.

Article 38 requires national law to define criteria establishing a sufficient connection between the applicant and the third country to make transfer reasonable.

Article 38(2)(b) and (c) of Directive 2013/32 permits reliance on publicly available sources and executive lists of safe third countries, provided that national law sets out a methodology for an individualised assessment of safety and allows the applicant to challenge the existence of the required connection.

Courts hearing appeals must verify the existence of such a connection, even if national law does not expressly grant that power.

The CJEU ruled that Articles 14 and 34 of the Recast Qualifications Directive must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides that a failure to comply with the obligation to give a personal interview to an international protection’s applicant, before a decision is adopted, would lead to that application to be inadmissible.

The CJEU further concluded that it could only be allowed if the legislation gives the opportunity to the international protection’s applicant, in the appeal procedure, to set out in person all of his or her arguments against the decision in a hearing which complies with the applicable conditions and fundamental guarantees, under Article 15 of that Directive. The last condition would be, according to the ruling of the CJEU, that those arguments are not capable of altering that decision.

The Federal Administrative Court has to clarify whether the petition for action directed solely at the obligation to decide on the asylum application is admissible. The question if it is also possible to directly oblige the defendant to grant international protection or to establish prohibitions on deportation by means of an action is not the subject of the decision. As a result, the court comes to the conclusion that there was a delay by the respondent of providing the decision on the asylum application without sufficient reason and that the plaintiff has a need for legal protection for its action for failure to act.

Law 12/2009 establishes a special guarantee for applications for international protection filed at the border, providing that legal assistance is mandatory at the time of formalising the request, and has to be provided even if the applicant does not ask for it or rejects it.

Moreover, communication must be in the language preferred by the applicant unless there is another language that he understands and in which he is able to communicate clearly.

The Court found that the new DL 34/2008 in no way affects the legal regime established by the previous Law 27/2008, which secures the right to a legal procedure free of judicial costs in asylum claims. The Law 27/2008, altered by the new Law 26/2014, does not establish a cost exemption, which, if it did, would be then regulated by the DL 34/2008.

The case focused on, among other things (consideration of documentation & country of origin information), the crucial issue of the duty of the State to provide appropriate and competent interpreters during the asylum process. Quashing the RAT (Refugee Appeals Tribunal)decision in this case, Faherty J ruled that she was not satisfied that the RAT had done its utmost, as required by law, to procure a Kurdish-Badini interpreter, and that the Court has to countenance the possibility that an error in interpretation could account for the perceived discrepancies in the applicant’s oral evidence.