Case summaries

The CJEU ruled on  the scope of the right to an effective remedy provided for in Article 39 of the Asylum Procedures Directive and in Article 13 of the Returns Directive.

The CJEU ruled on  the scope of the right to an effective remedy provided for in Article 46 of the (Recast) Asylum Procedures Directive and in Article 13 of the Returns Directive.

The complainant, an Eritrean citizen and a single woman with a one-and-a-half-year-old child, filed a complaint against the decision of the Danish Immigration Service to reject her application in accordance with the Danish Aliens Act art. 29 (b) as the Greek authorities had granted her refugee status in Greece, valid until 25 November 2017. The complainant referred to the UNHCR EXCOM-conclusion no. 58/1989.

The Board did not find that the general social and economic conditions for refugees with a residence permit in Greece – although difficult – in itself could lead to the complainant not being referred to Greece as first asylum country. The Board did not find that the complainant as a single mother with a one-and-a-half-year-old child was to be considered quite particularly vulnerable. Consequently, the Refugee Appeals Board found the conditions for using Greece as first country of asylum fulfilled. The case was, however, remitted to the Immigration Service by the Appeals Board in May 2018 upon the Service's confirmation that they would consider the application in light of the applicant's residence permit having expired in Greece. 

The rescuing actor is not only responsible for the search and rescue operations but should also consider the safety of disembarkation points in line with the principle of non-refoulement. The Open Arms ship conducted a reasonable assessment of the situation during the rescue operation, given that Libya could not be considered a country where the rescued migrants could be safely returned and Italy had already communicated an available place of safety.

it should be assessed whether the migrants – if rescued by the Libyan authorities - would have been taken back to a country where there are ongoing severe violations of human rights. In the case at issue, Libya has to be considered such a country.  the rescuing actor is not only responsible for the SAR operations but also for the designation of a POS (place of safety) for the migrants to be disembarked at. the principle of non-refoulement had to be applied. the decision to communicate with the Italian authorities, which were the first interlocutor with the Open Arms during the entire operation, including during the disembarking phase, is considered reasonable.

An internal armed conflict, characterised by armed clashes, prevails throughout the whole territory of Afghanistan. The situation in the Kabul region and the city itself constitutes indiscriminate violence resulting from this internal armed conflict.

Transferring a family to Finland under the Dublin Regulation where their asylum application and subsequent appeals have been rejected is unlawful on account of the humanitarian and security situation in Afghanistan. 

NB: the case was referred to the Grand Chamber, which issued a new ruling on 13 February 2020. For the EDAL summary of the final judgment, see here.

The continued and exclusive control of contracting State's authorities over individuals creates, at least, a de facto exercise of jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR. 

Article 3 of the ECHR imposes an absolute obligation on contracting States not to deport an asylum seeker where doing so would expose him or her to a genuine and serious risk of violence. Under the discretionary clause in Article 17(1) of the Dublin III Regulation, this remains the case where the application does not fall within the immediate responsibilities of that State.

Even where there are no substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the Member State responsible, a Dublin transfer can only be carried out in conditions which exclude the possibility that that transfer might result in a real and proven risk of the person concerned suffering inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 CFR EU.

If there is a real and proven risk that the state of health of an applicant who suffers from a serious mental or physical illness would significantly and permanently deteriorate, that transfer would constitute a violation of Article 4 CFR EU.

It is for the courts and authorities of the requesting Member State to eliminate any serious doubts concerning the impact of the transfer on the health of the person concerned by taking all necessary precaution. If the taking of precautions is not sufficient, it is for the authorities of the Member State concerned to suspend the execution of the transfer for as long as the applicant’s conditions render him unfit for transfer.

Member States may choose to conduct its own examination of that person’s application by making use of the “discretionary clause” laid down in Article 17(1) DRIII, but is not required to do so.

Article 3 ECHR is triggered in cases involving the removal of a seriously ill individual where the absence of appropriate treatment in the receiving country or the lack of access to such treatment, exposes the individual to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his or her state of health resulting in intense suffering or to a significant reduction in life expectancy.

Access to sufficient and appropriate medical care must be available in reality, not merely in theory and the impact of removal on an applicant must be assessed by considering how an applicant’s condition would evolve after transfer to the receiving State.