Case summaries
The CJEU ruled that Articles 14 and 34 of the Recast Qualifications Directive must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides that a failure to comply with the obligation to give a personal interview to an international protection’s applicant, before a decision is adopted, would lead to that application to be inadmissible.
The CJEU further concluded that it could only be allowed if the legislation gives the opportunity to the international protection’s applicant, in the appeal procedure, to set out in person all of his or her arguments against the decision in a hearing which complies with the applicable conditions and fundamental guarantees, under Article 15 of that Directive. The last condition would be, according to the ruling of the CJEU, that those arguments are not capable of altering that decision.
The Federal Administrative Court has to clarify whether the petition for action directed solely at the obligation to decide on the asylum application is admissible. The question if it is also possible to directly oblige the defendant to grant international protection or to establish prohibitions on deportation by means of an action is not the subject of the decision. As a result, the court comes to the conclusion that there was a delay by the respondent of providing the decision on the asylum application without sufficient reason and that the plaintiff has a need for legal protection for its action for failure to act.
Following the careful examination of International, European and domestic law, the Court concluded that the grant of refugee status supersedes any order made by a Family Court (regarding the return of the child to Pakistan), because it is the Secretary of State for the Home Department that is the entrusted public authority to deal with asylum matters. However, were the Family Court to discover new facts, the relevant public authority would be responsible, in principle, under the tenets of UK Administrative Law to review their decision.
In appealing against the Migration Agency’s and the Migration Court’s rejections of the Applicant’s application for leave to remain in Sweden, the Applicant claimed grounds for protection which he/she had not previously raised before the Migration Agency. Claiming grounds for protection meant that special requirements for asylum applications applied and the Applicant was entitled to a personal interview before the Migration Agency. The Migration Court of Appeal referred the Applicant’s case back to the Migration Agency as the Migration Court could not be the body to try the asylum application in the first instance.
The provisions of the Asylum Procedures Directive have been fully transposed into the CESEDA. A decision of the OFPRA based on all the documents/ evidence submitted by the applicant in support of his subsequent application without an interview does not infringe Article 41(2) of the Charter. When OFPRA considered the subsequent application, it was legitimate for it to have rejected the application without any interview since the new documents/ evidence provided were without merits. The Court found that M.A’s application must be rejected without any need to re-examine the facts he submitted, including those in his first application. The application of M.A was rejected.
The case refers to an administrative appeal before the Supreme Court brought by the Appellant against the High National Court’s judgment denying the right to asylum and subsidiary protection.
The Appellant is a Cameroonian national.In the application he claims to be a minor and that the grounds for persecution was his sexual orientation.
The Supreme Court upheld the appeal and reversed the challenged judgment.Furthermore the Court ordered a reconsideration of the administrative procedure from the beginning, in order to provide the asylum seeker with legal assistance.
There has been a violation of Article 47 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union if there is a failure to hold a hearing at the Asylum Court, notwithstanding that the facts of the case are not sufficiently clear. Merely general statements without reference to the case in point do not represent sufficient grounds for the lack of credibility of the submission.
Refugee status was recognised for a transgender woman from Pakistan because discrimination for reasons relevant to asylum as well as involuntary prostitution to earn a living are sufficiently serious to represent persecution within the meaning of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.
This case concerned the appropriate interpretation to be given to the determination of the Court of Justice in Case C-277/2012, M.M. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform in answer to the questions posed by the High Court of Ireland pursuant to Article 267 TFEU.
The Court of Justice answered in the negative the question posed that the duty to cooperate required the decision maker to supply the Applicant with a draft of any possible adverse decision for comment prior to its formal adoption.
However, the Court of Justice also considered the Irish system for protection decision making more broadly and concluded that it was unlawful not to allow for a further hearing of the Applicant in the course of examination of the subsidiary protection application – following the conclusion of a negative decision on an asylum claim.
The High Court held that the appropriate interpretation to be given to the judgment in this regard was that, in order for a hearing to be effective, it would at a minimum, involve a procedure whereby the Applicant was invited to comment on any adverse credibility findings made at the asylum stage; a completely fresh opportunity to revisit all matters bearing on the claim for subsidiary protection; and a completely fresh assessment of the Applicant's credibility in circumstances where the mere fact that the asylum decision maker had ruled adversely on this question would not in itself suffice or be directly relevant to this fresh credibility assessment.
The Court opined that the finding of the Court of Justice did not suggest that an oral hearing would be routinely required at subsidiary protection stage, but considered it unnecessary at that juncture to conclusively determine the issue.